Recent Vox columns on the Greek Crisis

Richard Baldwin 21 June 2015

a

A

Greece is solvent but illiquid: Policy implications

Paul De Grauwe, 3 July 2015

Greece’s debt is 180% of GDP, which seems to make it insolvent without large primary surpluses. This column argues that since restructuring lowered the interest burden to just 2% of GDP, Greece is solvent – or would be with nominal GDP growth of just 2%. The ECB’s misdiagnosis has caused an unnecessary banking crisis. The solution is to accept that Greek debt is sustainable, so the austerity programme can be relaxed and liquidity support provided to the Greek banking sector. 

Greece can still avoid a catastrophic exit from the Eurozone

Domingo Cavallo, 30 June 2015

Grexit and the reintroduction of the drachma would have severe consequences for the Greek people. This column argues, based on Argentina's experience, that this would produce a sharp devaluation of the drachma, inflation, and a severe reduction in real wages and pensions. The effects would be far worse than the reductions that could have occurred as a consequence of the policies proposed by the Troika. By resuming negotiations, continuing with measures to achieve fiscal consolidation and carrying out adequate structural reforms, Greece could reverse the current situation in a sustainable way. It has the great advantage that the ECB, most European governments and the IMF are willing to resume negotiations.

Grexit: The staggering cost of central bank dependence

Charles Wyplosz, 29 June 2015

This weekend’s dramatic events saw the ECB capping emergency assistance to Greece. This column argues that the ECB’s decision is the last of a long string of ECB mistakes in this crisis. Beyond triggering Greece’s Eurozone exit – thus revoking the euro’s irrevocability – it has shattered Eurozone governance and brought the politicisation of the ECB to new heights. Bound to follow are chaos in Greece and agitation of financial markets – both with unknown consequences.

Greece – the day after: Time for a fresh start

Thorsten Beck 28 June 2015

The breakdown of negotiations between Greece and the Troika comes as a shock. It is not, however, the end of the game. This column argues that the rupture can serve as a starting point for a new relationship between Greece and its creditors – an approach that does not provide fresh cash to the Greek government and does not impose specific policy reforms from outside.

Greece: Seizing the Crisis’s reform opportunities

Michalis Haliassos, Saturday, June 20, 2015

The Greek adjustment programme failed. This column argues that the problem lay in the programme’s design. By focusing on deficit reductions and the wrong type of reform, it failed to build up the only thing that could provide the basis for debt repayment – namely a dynamic, export-oriented productive base. A broader reform agenda that creates hope would be accepted by Greeks and it would make eventual repayment more likely. The need for some patience in reaching the final destination of this journey should no longer be an excuse for not taking the first step.

A programme for Greece: Follow the IMF’s research

Ashoka Mody, Thursday, June 18, 2015

The Greek crisis continues to take centre stage in policy debates. This column provides insight on the topic using evidence from three recent IMF studies. A suggested programme for Greece includes debt relief (debt equal to 50% of GDP and payable over 40 years), scaling down the banking system, and setting a flat 0.5% of GDP primary surplus over the next three years.

Greece: A credible deal will require difficult decisions by all sides

Olivier Blanchard, Monday, June 15, 2015

Greece’s negotiations with its creditors is at a critical point. This column, by the IMF’s Chief Economist, discusses the offer made to the Greek government. For the deal to work, the Greek government needs a credible budget plan for attaining the targeted surpluses, and European creditors need to agree to significant additional financing, and to debt relief sufficient to maintain debt sustainability. Under the existing proposal, debt relief can be achieved through a long rescheduling of debt payments at low interest rates.

What went wrong in Greece and how to fix it

Paolo Manasse, Friday, June 12, 2015

Greece’s problem came from the bursting of a debt-financed growth bubble inflated with the help of EZ membership. This column argues that the inevitable adjustment was more painful than necessary. The fiscal consolidation was too tight and too front-loaded, and, importantly, structural reform wasn’t properly sequenced. By concentrating on labour market rather than product market reforms, the sharp wage fall could not be paralleled by a similar reduction in prices, and now soaring inequality is undermining support for needed reforms.

The modern Greek tragedy

Jeremy Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff, Wednesday, June 10, 2015

The conventional wisdom in Greece is that the nation has suffered years of excessive, Troika-imposed austerity in a short-sighted effort to extract maximum repayment. This column argues that, in fact, Greece was a net receiver of Troika funds from 2010 to mid-2014, with a modest reverse flow since Greece stalled on its reforms. Both sides have negotiated in their self interest – influenced by bargaining threat points that have had everything to do with the direct costs of default and little to do with Greece’s concern about its reputation for making repayments.

Greece: Seeking a way forward

Elias Papaioannou, Richard Portes and Lucrezia Reichlin, Friday, June 19, 2015

Greece seems to be on the verge of an agreement that would release much needed funds. This column argues that an agreement on completion of the second programme will not restore confidence, nor will it resolve the deep economic, financial and political uncertainties that confront Greece today. The focus should swiftly shift to the design of an efficient, realistic and truly reforming new programme.

A parallel currency for Greece: Part I

Biagio Bossone and Marco Cattaneo, Monday, May 25, 2015

To prevent it from defaulting on its debt, the Greek government might need to introduce a new domestic currency, in parallel to the euro. This column, the first in a two-part series, compares the current proposals for a parallel currency and discusses how such a policy instrument could promote economic recovery.

A parallel currency for Greece: Part II

Biagio Bossone and Marco Cattaneo, Tuesday, May 26, 2015

Introducing a currency in parallel to the euro could help Greece repay its external debt and resume economic activity. This second column in a two-part series evaluates the different options and their effects on aggregate demand and fiscal sustainability. The authors propose a tax credit certificates programme, which they argue could generate new spending capacity and avoid the adoption of new austerity measures. 

Lessons from the 1982 Mexican Debt Crisis for Greece

Carlos Cantú, KeyYong Park and Aaron Tornell, Sunday, April 12, 2015

The wisdom of structural reform during a crisis is a subject of heated debate. This column compares Greece’s experience to that of Mexico during the debt crisis of the 1980s. Mexico did not receive a haircut until seven years into the crisis – after structural reform was already underway. In Mexico that reform was the outcome of an internal conversation – not a diktat from the outside – and it happened during the height of the crisis.

Politics and regional allocation of public investments

Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, Yannis Psycharis and Vassilis Tselios, Tuesday, March 3, 2015

Electoral results and the geographical allocation of public investment in Greece have been intimately related. This column describes how incumbent Greek governments between 1975 and 2009 tended to reward those constituencies returning them to office. Increases in both the absolute and relative electoral returns for the party in government in a given Greek region were traditionally repaid with a greater level of per capita investment in that region. Single-member constituencies were the greatest beneficiaries of this type of pork-barrel politics.

Greece: No escape from the inevitable

Lars P Feld, Christoph M Schmidt, Isabel Schnabel, Benjamin Weigert and Volker Wieland, Friday, February 20, 2015

Claims that ‘austerity has failed’ are popular, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. This column argues that this narrative is factually wrong and ignores the reasons underlying the Greek crisis. The worst move for Greece would be to return to its old ways. Greece needs to realise that things could actually become much worse than they are now, particularly if membership in the Eurozone cannot be assured. Instead of looking back, Greece needs to continue building a functioning state and a functioning market economy.

Fair debt relief for Greece: New calculations

Thomas Philippon, Tuesday, February 10, 2015

Greece has a problem with debt that must be addressed on way or the other. This column proposes a way to estimate a ‘fair’ level of fiscal consolidation in Greece. The author’s central argument is that contagion risk made the Greek crisis worse by preventing early debt restructuring. If restructuring took place in 2010 instead of 2012, Greece’s debt to GDP ratio would have been 30 percentage points lower today. To bring Greece’s debt under 120% of GDP, it would be fair for Greece to run a 3% primary surplus over the next decade or two. This is less than the current target of 4.5% but still requires a significant effort.

Groundhog Day in Greece

Thorsten Beck, Monday, February 2, 2015

The Greek-Troika conflict is roiling markets, boardrooms and cabinet offices around the world. Crises are best solved by recognising losses, allocating them and moving on, so the biggest risk, this column argues, is that a compromise kicks the can further down the road. As the can rolls on, the scenery becomes politically and socially less attractive – fuelling the rise of political animosities, nationalism, and fringe parties. Greece is a special case but indicative of the core problem – deficient EZ governance structures that mean societies are stuck with increasing socioeconomic exclusion and political despair. The crisis will continue until the necessary further deepening of EZ institutional structures is completed.

a

A

Topics:  Europe's nations and regions Macroeconomic policy

Tags:  Greece, Eurozone crisis, Debt crisis

Professor of International Economics, Graduate Institute, Geneva; Director of CEPR; Vox Editor-in-Chief

Vox Talks