Trade liberalisation and embedded institutional reform: Evidence from Chinese exporters
Amit Khandelwal, Peter K. Schott , Shang-Jin Wei 15 January 2013
The institutions that manage trade barriers are subject to corruption, imposing additional distortions. This column shows that in China, the government misallocated quota licenses permitting firms to export. When the US and EU abolished quotas governing textile exports in 2005, China experienced productivity gains not only from the actual elimination of the quota but also from the termination of the misallocation due to inefficient licensing.
Economists traditionally assess the welfare losses of trade barriers without considering the underlying institutions that support them. In fact, these institutions may amplify welfare losses substantially. Corrupt customs agents, bureaucratic red tape and the withholding of goods in bonded warehouses may favour some firms at the expense of others, resulting in a substantial misallocation of resources. Anecdotal evidence along these lines is easy to spot.
Institutions and economics International trade
China, import quota, export licence