Bank resolution is a key pillar of the European Banking Union. This column argues that the current structure of large EU banks is not conducive to an effective and unbiased resolution procedure. The authors would require systemically important banks to reorganise into a ‘holding company’ structure, where the parent company holds unsecured term debt sufficient to cover losses at its operating financial subsidiaries. This would facilitate a ‘single point of entry’ resolution procedure, minimising the risk of creditor runs and destructive ring-fencing by national regulators.
Georg Ringe, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Wednesday, January 28, 2015
Stefano Micossi, Thursday, June 5, 2014
The European banking union is in pressing need of a unified banking resolution mechanism, but public bail-in has become increasingly unpopular. This column details new legislation towards a single resolution mechanism in the EU that minimises public exposure. The shareholders of an insolvent bank will be the first to take the hit, followed by creditors, before the public. This has the advantage also of mitigating moral hazard.
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Georg Ringe, Wednesday, April 30, 2014
The European Parliament recently adopted the Single Resolution Mechanism. Though supposed to be a pillar of the European banking union, it is fraught with difficulties. This column makes a proposal for a new organisational structure that can deal with bank failure more effectively. European banks should be required to self-insure against failure. Further, the ECB should be the only financially credible player to provide liquidity for the resolution procedure. These proposals would strengthen the current banking union project, and can overcome certain political difficulties.