In international trade disputes, coercion is often used against governments whose trade practices are deemed unfair. This column presents a theoretical model that offers a new rationale for the greater effectiveness of multilateral compared to unilateral coercion, and hence provides a new argument in favour of commitment to international organisations.
Vincent Anesi, Giovanni Facchini, Saturday, August 8, 2015 - 00:00
Diego Bonomo, Saturday, March 1, 2014 - 00:00
When a dispute in the WTO does not reach any resolution, the offended member country can request the right to retaliate against the offender. This column reviews the profile of most common retaliation-requesting members. There is a preference among certain countries to either pursue retaliation, or resist compliance. The magnitude of requests and the means of retaliation are also discussed. Overall, requesting retaliation is an important tool of analysis, as it often reveals a country’s goals in the WTO disputes.