Policymakers have long been concerned that large capital inflows are associated with asset-price booms. This column presents recent research showing that the composition of capital inflows also matters. The association between capital inflows and asset-price booms is about twice as strong for debt-related than for equity-related investment. Policymakers should therefore pay attention to the composition of capital inflows, since debt-related inflows may still undermine financial stability even if they do not result in an overall current-account deficit.
Like all other over-the-counter derivatives markets, the UK credit default swap (CDS) market has traditionally been opaque, and important questions have been largely unanswered: How do UK CDS market participants trade? Who are the main players? And how did they behave during the financial crisis? Based on newly available transactions data, this column gives some first answers to these questions.
Of the three pillars of the nascent European banking union, establishing a unified bank-resolution mechanism is the most pressing issue. This column suggests some changes to the existing Single Resolution Mechanism proposals. The decision to initiate resolution should be left to the ECB and national resolution authorities. Debt automatically convertible into equity when capital thresholds are violated could partially replace liabilities subject to bail-in. The Single Bank Resolution Fund must be supranational to ensure the credibility of the mechanism.
Basel III is coming into focus. The fundamental logic of the regulatory changes seems sensible, but the devil is in the detail – empirical implementation. This column discusses a detailed quantitative study, incorporating analytical calculations, Monte Carlo simulations and results from observed data. It concludes that the Basel Committee has taken three and a half steps backwards and half a step forward. If implemented, the framework is likely to lead to less robust risk forecasts than current methodologies.
There is widespread agreement that government protection of banks contributed to the financial crisis, leading to proposals to require banks to finance a larger share of their portfolios with equity instead of debt – thus forcing shareholders to absorb losses instead of taxpayers. This column argues that equity ratios relative to asset risk are what matter, not equity ratios per se. Although higher equity requirements for banks may be desirable, the costs of reduced loan supply should be taken into account.
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