Global crisis

A ‘crowding out’ theory of the Eurozone crisis

Fernando A Broner, Aitor Erce, Alberto Martin, Jaume Ventura, 23 July 2014

By 2010, Eurozone periphery countries had faced severe debt problems and a falling credit to the private sector. This column proposes a theory to interpret these events. Governments can discriminate in favour of domestic creditors and public debts trade in secondary markets. This leads to a shift in the debt holdings from foreign to domestic residents. Finally, private financial frictions crowd out private investment, potentially reducing growth.

The failed policy response to the Global Crisis

Richard Wood, 13 July 2014

The Global Crisis triggered a series of medium-term policy changes. This column reviews the effectiveness of some of these monetary, fiscal policies, and internal devaluation policies. Policymakers anchored their strategic thinking in paradigms that became inapplicable to the new problems. An alternative set of macroeconomic policies is suggested.

Revisiting the pain in Spain

Paul De Grauwe, 7 July 2014

There has been a stark contrast between the experiences of Spain and the UK since the Global Crisis. This column argues that although the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions policy has been instrumental in reducing Spanish government bond yields, it has not made the Spanish fiscal position sustainable. Although the UK has implemented less austerity than Spain since the start of the crisis, a large currency depreciation has helped to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio

R&D internationalisation during the Global Crisis

Bernhard Dachs, Georg Zahradnik, 6 July 2014

The Global Crisis brought a halt to three decades of R&D internationalisation, in which foreign firms’ share of total R&D expenditure had increased in almost all countries where data is available. However, this column argues that the crisis did not lead to a new global distribution of overseas R&D expenditure, despite the erosion of the EU’s share. The persistence of R&D expenditure is attributed to the costs of relocating R&D and to the autonomy of foreign subsidiaries.

Lessons from history for the Eurozone Crisis

Selin Sayek, Fatma Taskin, 5 July 2014

The European Monetary Union is unprecedented, but the Eurozone Crisis is not. This column draws upon the experiences of previous banking crises, and compares the Eurozone Crisis countries. Like Japan before the 1992 crisis, Spain and Ireland had property bubbles fuelled by domestic credit. The Greek crisis is very distinct from crises in other Eurozone countries, so a one-size-fits-all policy would be inappropriate. The duration and severity of past crises suggest the road ahead will continue to be very rough.

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