Macroeconomic policy

James Costain, Anton Nakov, 03 October 2015

Many models rely on the assumption of nominal price stickiness. But the different definitions of frictions can greatly alter their macroeconomic implications. In this column, price stickiness is modelled as the result of errors due to costly decision-making. Errors in the prices firms set help explain micro ‘puzzles’ relating to the sizes of price changes, the behaviour of adjustment hazards, and the variability of prices and costs. Errors in adjustment timing increase the real effects of monetary shocks, by reducing the ‘selection effect’.

Carlos Garriga, Finn Kydland, Roman Šustek, 01 October 2015

An important channel for monetary policy transmission is through mortgage markets. This column illustrates how the effects of an interest rate lift-off, from the zero lower bound, on homeowners depend on three factors: the prevalent mortgage type in the economy (fixed or adjustable rate), the speed of the lift-off, and the inflation rate during the lift-off. This channel of transmission suggests that if the purpose of the lift-off is to normalise nominal interest rates without derailing the recovery, the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England should wait until the economies show convincing signs of inflation taking off. Furthermore, the lift-off should be gradual and in line with inflation.

Dennis Reinhardt, Rhiannon Sowerbutts, 27 September 2015

Regulatory arbitrage is an essential feature of modern banking. This column presents new evidence on avoiding macroprudential policies by borrowing from abroad. Domestic non-banks borrow more from abroad after an increase in capital requirements, but not after an increase in lending standards. This is most likely because of differences in the way the two regulations apply, and suggests that we should have strong frameworks for reciprocating capital regulation.

Giancarlo Corsetti, 07 September 2015

At the birth of the euro, the fiscal, financial, and monetary institutions in Europe were not sufficiently developed. This chapter describes these inefficiencies and the role they played in the Eurozone crisis. Instability in the Eurozone grew out of a disruptive deadlock between national governments forced to address and correct fundamental weaknesses in their national economies on their own, and the EZ-level policymaking. The future of the Eurozone therefore rests on developing an institutional framework that can credibly deliver stability at the EZ level.

Agnès Benassy-Quéré, 07 September 2015

The problems in the Eurozone are not a side effect of the Global Crisis but rather date back to the Maastricht treaty. This chapter proposes a few possible remedies. First, it is necessary to make debt restructuring possible within the Eurozone. In particular, the risk loop between sovereigns and banks needs to be stopped through more diversified balance sheets. The second suggestion involves more shared sovereignty, not only for debtor countries, but also for creditors. At a minimum, the Eurozone needs a fiscal backstop for its banking union.

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