Politics and economics

Jan Fredrick P. Cruz, Ronald U Mendoza , 31 August 2015

Clinton. Bush. Kennedy. Political family dynasties have survived the establishment of democracies in the developed and developing world and, in some cases, are strengthening. This column argues that political dynasties are still with us, and that it’s fairly easy to see why. Whoever said that elections are the only time that the vote of the richest citizen is equivalent to that of the poorest needs to start rethinking whether this still holds true.

Vincent Anesi, Giovanni Facchini, 08 August 2015

In international trade disputes, coercion is often used against governments whose trade practices are deemed unfair. This column presents a theoretical model that offers a new rationale for the greater effectiveness of multilateral compared to unilateral coercion, and hence provides a new argument in favour of commitment to international organisations.

James A Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, Thierry Verdier, 27 July 2015

Economists have long understood that policy chosen by politics is unlikely to be socially optimal. This is because politicians face the probability of losing power and may discount the future too much, or act to improve their re-election probability. This column explores these issues taking into account the fact that future government revenue is uncertain. Public income volatility acts to reduce the efficiency of public policy. This has important implications for developing countries that rely on income from volatile sources, such as natural resource extraction.

Igal Hendel, Saul Lach, Yossi Spiegel, 19 June 2015

It is well-documented that social media is an enabler of mass protests. Social media-led protests and how they interact with the economy are, however, less well-understood. This column focusses on boycotts of cottage cheese (a staple food) in Israel as a protest against increased prices and finds that firms seem to react to these threats and set prices not only on the basis of demand elasticities, as traditional analysis in industrial organisation assumes, but also on the basis of the business environment – something which is not easily captured by traditional analysis.

Paola Conconi, David DeRemer, Georg Kirchsteiger, Lorenzo Trimarchi, Maurizio Zanardi, 16 June 2015

Economic cycles patently influence politics. This column explores an unexplored avenue of political economy research by assessing whether US politicians file international trade disputes to win votes. It turns out they do. This means that disputes might be brought earlier or later than they otherwise would – potentially costing lots more than they should – and that violations in industries that are deemed unimportant by electioneering politicians go unpunished.

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