Abenomics is Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s policy package consisting of three ‘arrows’:
- Aggressive monetary easing.
- Flexible fiscal policy.
- Growth strategies.
Together, they aim at lifting Japan’s economy from chronic deflation and stagnation to a normal economy with 2% inflation and strong growth.
Will Abenomics succeed?
Abe’s first arrow hit the target. The Bank of Japan announced bold “quantitative and qualitative easing” measures on 4 April, doubling both the volume of long-term bond purchases per month and the average maturity of government bonds.
Between 15 November 2012 to mid-April 2013, the yen depreciated against the US dollar by 20%,
- Stock prices rose 50%.
- Consumption was boosted in the first and second quarters.
- Profits of exporting firms improved dramatically, boosting share prices.
In short, the first arrow is working beautifully.
The second arrow, released as the supplementary budget of the last fiscal year, increased government spending (mostly on infrastructure). Targeting the second quarter of this year, it is intended to be a short-term stimulus.
Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio, exceeding 200% (OECD, 2013), is the worst one among the OECD countries, with annual fiscal deficits of about 8% over the last three years. So, the short-term stimulus has to be followed by a medium-term fiscal consolidation. Fortunately, a plan is in place, with the major parties having agreed to and passed legislation (in August 2012) raising the consumption tax rate from 5 to 8% in April 2014, and then to 10% in October 2015 (IMF, 2013).
Thanks to the first and second arrows, the economy is firmly on the recovery path and ready for the third arrow – growth strategies.
Could the consumption kill the recovery?
But just as the third arrow is ready for release, Abe’s commitment to the already legislated consumption-tax hike seems to be wavering. His personal economic advisers became opposed to the scheduled consumption-tax hike. They argue that the deflationary economy is not strong enough to withstand the scheduled hike, favouring either a one-year delay in its implementation or a smoother implementation through one-percentage-point increases each year for five years.
But the argument that the scheduled hike risks deflation and stagnation is not well supported by the data.
- The annualised quarterly growth rates of the first and second quarter this year were 4.1% and 3.8%, respectively (according to the revised estimates released on 9 September).
- Examining the contributing components, many analysts consider that growth will continue for at least several quarters.
Given Japan’s potential growth rate is now estimated to be between 0.5–1%-due to the declining working-age population- recent growth definitely shows a strong recovery.
- It is unlikely that the tax hike will derail the economy from the expansionary path, barring an unexpected shock.
Opponents argue that a tax rate hike necessarily causes a drop in consumption and broader aggregate demand, but this will be temporary. One aspect that is often ignored is that consumption drop post-rate hike follows a rush-to-buy demand pre-rate hike. If the three-percentage-point hike is implemented as scheduled in April 2014, surge and decline between first- and second-quarter GDP can be smoothed by shifting outlays of government expenditure and/or the use of pinpoint subsidies for housing investment for the second quarter.
Would the new consumption tax hike be like the 1997 one?
Opponents often invoke the ‘lesson of 1997’ to challenge the view of temporary demand decline after the rate hike, reminding that the consumption tax increase in April 1997 from 3 to 5% was followed by a large GDP drop in 1998.
But this argument gives inadequate weight to the role of financial crises.
- The Asian financial crisis drastically depressed demand in Asia in the second half of 1997 and the first half of 1998.
- In November 1997, two large Japanese financial institutions, Hokkaido Takushoku