In the lead up to the global financial crisis, there was a substantial credit boom in advanced economies. In the Eurozone, cross-border flows played an especially important role in the boom-bust cycle. This column examines how the common currency and linkages between member states contributed to the Eurozone crisis. A very strong relationship between pre-crisis levels of external imbalances and macroeconomic performance since 2008 is observed. The findings point to the importance of delinking banks and sovereigns, and the need for macro-financial policies that manage the risks associated with excessive international debt flows.
Philip R. Lane, Monday, September 7, 2015 - 00:00
David Amiel, Paul-Adrien Hyppolite, Sunday, March 15, 2015 - 00:00
Vincent Bouvatier, Anne-Laure Delatte, Sunday, December 14, 2014 - 00:00
Charles Wyplosz, Friday, September 12, 2014 - 00:00
Paul De Grauwe, Monday, July 7, 2014 - 00:00
There has been a stark contrast between the experiences of Spain and the UK since the Global Crisis. This column argues that although the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions policy has been instrumental in reducing Spanish government bond yields, it has not made the Spanish fiscal position sustainable. Although the UK has implemented less austerity than Spain since the start of the crisis, a large currency depreciation has helped to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio
Joshua Aizenman, Thursday, July 3, 2014 - 00:00
After a promising first decade, the Eurozone faced a severe crisis. This column looks at the Eurozone’s short history through the lens of an evolutionary approach to forming new institutions. German dominance has allowed the euro to achieve a number of design objectives, and this may continue if Germany does not shirk its responsibilities. Germany’s resilience and dominant size within the EU may explain its ‘muddling through’ approach to the Eurozone crisis. Greater mobility of labour and lower mobility of under-regulated capital may be the costly ‘second best’ adjustment until the arrival of more mature Eurozone institutions.
Marco Buti, Maria Demertzis, João Nogueira Martins, Sunday, March 30, 2014 - 00:00
Although progress has been made on resolving the Eurozone crisis – vulnerable countries have reduced their current-account deficits and implemented some reforms – more still needs to be done. This column argues for a ‘consistent trinity’ of policies: structural reforms within countries, more symmetric macroeconomic adjustment across countries, and a banking union for the Eurozone.
Jeffrey Frankel, Monday, March 24, 2014 - 00:00
The Eurozone needs to further ease monetary policy because under the current low inflation and high unemployment periphery countries need to suffer painful deflation. However, the ECB faces challenges other central banks do not face. This column proposes a way to overcome some of these hurdles. It argues that the ECB should buy US treasury securities, lowering the foreign exchange value of the euro. That would be the best way to restore the export sector of the periphery countries.
Michael Bordo, Friday, March 21, 2014 - 00:00
Since 2007, there has been a buildup of TARGET imbalances within the Eurosystem – growing liabilities of national central banks in the periphery matched by growing claims of central banks in the core. This column argues that, rather than signalling the collapse of the monetary system – as was the case for Bretton Woods between 1968 and 1971 – these TARGET imbalances represent a successful institutional innovation that prevented a repeat of the US payments crisis of 1933.
Daniel Gros, Wednesday, March 19, 2014 - 00:00
Since the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, the argument for a system of fiscal transfers to offset idiosyncratic shocks in the Eurozone has gained adherents. This column argues that what the Eurozone really needs is not a system which offsets all shocks by some small fraction, but a system which protects against shocks which are rare, but potentially catastrophic. A system of fiscal insurance with a fixed deductible would therefore be preferable to a fiscal shock absorber that offsets a certain percentage of all fiscal shocks.
Agnès Benassy-Quéré, Philippe Martin, Thursday, February 6, 2014 - 00:00
The euro has appreciated sharply since July 2012. CEPR Policy Insight 70 argues that the strong euro is not the result of a ‘currency war’. The Eurozone suffers from an overly restrictive monetary policy. The sooner the ECB adopts a more aggressive monetary stance, the sooner the recovery will take hold. Easier Eurozone monetary conditions will lead to a temporarily depreciated Euro, which will support aggregate economic activity and help inflation stay close to 2%.
Agnès Benassy-Quéré, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Philippe Martin, Guillaume Plantin, Thursday, February 6, 2014 - 00:00
The euro has appreciated sharply since July 2012. This column introduces a CEPR Policy Insight which argues that the strong euro is not the result of a ‘currency war’. The Eurozone suffers from an overly restrictive monetary policy. The sooner the ECB adopts a more aggressive monetary stance, the sooner the recovery will take hold. Easier Eurozone monetary conditions will lead to a temporarily depreciated euro, which will support aggregate economic activity and help inflation stay close to 2%.
Ayako Saiki, Sunghyun Henry Kim, Sunday, February 2, 2014 - 00:00
Before the introduction of the euro, it was hoped that by promoting increased intra-regional trade it would increase business-cycle synchronisation within the Eurozone, and thus help it to fulfil the criteria for an optimum currency area. This column presents recent research that compares the evolution of business-cycle synchronisation in the Eurozone and east Asia. While the euro has had some impact on business-cycle synchronisation in the Eurozone, it has done so not through increased intra-regional trade intensity, but rather through some other channel – most likely financial integration.
Jeffrey Frankel, Friday, December 6, 2013 - 00:00
Except for the period 1992-2000, the dollar’s role as an international currency has been slowly declining since 1976. Since 2010, there has been another pause in this decline – somewhat surprising, given that the financial crisis began in the US, and given Congress’ recent flirtations with default. The dollar’s resilience as the world’s reserve currency is due to a lack of good alternatives – the euro has its own problems, and the yuan only accounts for 2.2% of forex transactions.
Mai Dao, Davide Furceri, Prakash Loungani, Sunday, December 1, 2013 - 00:00
Labour mobility is one of the keys to a successful currency union – be it within or across nations. This column discusses new evidence showing that the shock-absorbing role of migration has increased in Europe and declined in the US. During the Great Recession, European migration remained high – although not high enough given the vast differences across the Eurozone. Overall, Europe has strengthened this essential adjustment mechanism.
Alberto Cavallo, Brent Neiman, Roberto Rigobon, Friday, November 29, 2013 - 00:00
During the recent turmoil in the Eurozone, little attention has been paid to one of the euro’s founding objectives – price convergence. This column argues that the euro has in fact been very successful in this regard. In a study of the pricing behaviour of Apple, IKEA, H&M, and Zara, the authors find that price dispersion is 30–50% lower for countries in a currency union than for those with a fixed exchange rate.
Jens Nordvig, Monday, November 25, 2013 - 00:00
Having promised to do ‘whatever it takes’ to ensure the survival of the euro, the ECB now faces the problem of record high unemployment combined with a strong currency. There is accumulating evidence that the ECB is more willing to fight currency appreciation than the Bundesbank would have been. Capital inflows have been a key source of recent upward pressure on the euro. Should this continue, the ECB may need to intervene more aggressively in order to promote economic recovery in the Eurozone.
Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Luis Garicano, Tano Santos, Tuesday, April 30, 2013 - 00:00
By the end of the 1990s, under the incentive of Eurozone entry, most peripheral European countries were busy undertaking structural reforms and putting their fiscal houses in order. This column argues that the arrival of the euro, and the subsequent interest-rate convergence, loosened a tide of cheap money that reversed the incentives for further reforms. As a result, by the end of the euro’s first decade, the institutions and governance in the Eurozone periphery were in worse shape than they were at the start of the decade.
Mary Amiti, Oleg Itskhoki, Jozef Konings, Tuesday, February 19, 2013 - 00:00
Why is it that large movements in exchange rates have small effects on international prices? What does this mean for a crisis-stricken Eurozone? Using firm-level data, this column presents new research that investigates this exchange rate ‘disconnect’. Evidence suggests that the prices of the largest firms – with their disproportionately large share of trade – are insulated from exchange rate movements. The international competitiveness effects of a euro devaluation are therefore likely to be modest, given major exporters’ reliance on global supply chains.
Paolo Manasse, Thursday, January 17, 2013 - 00:00
All G7 economies are struggling in the post-crisis climate, but US GDP has recovered to pre-crisis levels, while the Eurozone simply hasn’t. This column portrays the global crisis as a transitory shock for the US, but as a quasi-permanent shock for Europe. The policies that are needed get the Eurozone back on track do not seem to be politically feasible. As tension rises with every quarter of stagnation, prospects for the survival of the euro are not only not improving, they are actually getting worse.