Michal Kobielarz, Burak Uras, Sylvester Eijffinger, Thursday, March 12, 2015

The Eurozone Crisis has been characterised by a sharp rise in sovereign interest rates in peripheral countries. The re-emergence of spreads between peripheral and core Eurozone countries at the start of the Greek crisis came after a decade of homogeneous interest rates in the monetary union. This column investigates the behaviour of spreads through the lens of a theory of implicit bailout guarantees.

Paul De Grauwe, Monday, July 7, 2014

There has been a stark contrast between the experiences of Spain and the UK since the Global Crisis. This column argues that although the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions policy has been instrumental in reducing Spanish government bond yields, it has not made the Spanish fiscal position sustainable. Although the UK has implemented less austerity than Spain since the start of the crisis, a large currency depreciation has helped to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio

Marco Buti, Maria Demertzis, João Nogueira Martins, Sunday, March 30, 2014

Although progress has been made on resolving the Eurozone crisis – vulnerable countries have reduced their current-account deficits and implemented some reforms – more still needs to be done. This column argues for a ‘consistent trinity’ of policies: structural reforms within countries, more symmetric macroeconomic adjustment across countries, and a banking union for the Eurozone.

Espen Henriksen, Finn Kydland, Roman Šustek, Wednesday, October 2, 2013

The monetary policy for Eurozone members is one-size-fits-all in an economic area rife with economic differences. Does this really make a difference? This column argues that even if each EZ member state had a fully independent monetary authority, monetary policies would likely still appear highly synchronised across EZ members.

Daniel Gros, Wednesday, August 24, 2011

Eurobonds are being touted as the silver bullet to resolve the Eurozone crisis. This column argues that the Eurobonds proposal fails on legal, political, and economic grounds. It says that, whatever the variant, Eurobonds only make sense in a political union—and given the vast differences in national political systems and their quality of governance, any political union created on paper will not work in practice.

Philip R. Lane, Monday, March 14, 2011

CEPR DP8287 seeks to explain the origins of the Irish crisis and provide an interim assessment of the Irish government’s management of the crisis. Finally, it evaluates the lessons from Ireland for the macroeconomics of monetary unions.

Francesco Paolo Mongelli, Saturday, May 1, 2010

CEPR Policy Insight No. 47 argues that the benefits of a monetary union develop gradually over time and require policymakers to seize opportunities and perseverance in the face of adversity.

Francesco Paolo Mongelli, Saturday, May 1, 2010

Why would countries share a single currency? This column introduces a new CEPR Policy Insight and argues that some aspects are missing in the current debate on the merits of the EMU. Benefiting from monetary union is a matter of time, perseverance, and seizing opportunities.

Mathias Hoffmann, Saturday, March 20, 2010

If a European Monetary Fund does happen, how would it work? This column proposes a European Sovereign Insurance Scheme to sell bond insurance on EMU members' sovereign debt. In good times the insurance fees would allow the EMF to build up a capital cushion. In bad times, the EMF could use these funds to facilitate an orderly unwinding of the default – while imposing tough conditions.

Francesco Paolo Mongelli, Thursday, March 11, 2010

This new Policy Insight asks why countries would share a single currency, and addresses some aspects missing from the current debate on the benefits of the euro area.

Francesco Paolo Mongelli, Thursday, March 11, 2010

Why would countries share a single currency? This column introduces a new CEPR Policy Insight and argues that some aspects are missing in the current debate on the merits of the EMU. Benefiting from monetary union is a matter of time, perseverance, and seizing opportunities.

Roel Beetsma, Massimo Giuliodori, Friday, November 27, 2009

Currency unions strip national governments of a macroeconomic policy instrument. What do they get in return? This column says the European Economic and Monetary Union has eliminated incentives for competitive devaluations and enhanced inflation credibility. But monetary union may necessitate fiscal coordination and discipline.

Marco Buti, Vitor Gaspar, Wednesday, December 24, 2008

This column looks back at the first ten years of the euro, from the uncertainty surrounding its adoption to the one caused by the current crisis. In between, the euro proved a resounding success. It is worth remembering the magnitude of the original challenge in order to use the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen European governance.

Nikolaus Wolf, Thursday, May 29, 2008

Prior to 1914, Europe was economically integrated across political borders. The “second Thirty Year War” (1914-1945) put up barriers that post-war European integration has been undoing since the 1950s, returning Europe to a familiar state of economic affairs.

Michael Bordo, Harold James, Friday, April 4, 2008

The euro may surpass the dollar in coming decades to become the leading international currency. This column summarises four major challenges that the euro must survive for that to come true.

Peter B. Kenen, Ellen E. Meade, Thursday, February 7, 2008

Many regions are discussing possible monetary unions; a new book argues that they are not in the position to replicate the European experience.

Andrew K Rose, Wednesday, February 6, 2008

Since World War II, economies have exited currency unions at an average rate of one per year. Yet the evidence confounds established theory: economists are unable to predict which economies are likely to leave currency unions.

Giuseppe Bertola, Thursday, October 11, 2007

Empirical research shows that EMU improves economic performance, but is also associated with higher inequality and lower social spending. This casts doubt on the political sustainability of EMU without social-policy integration and much deeper financial market development. Thinking about EMU’s future, it would be wrong and dangerous to disregard the implications for income inequality and its remedies.

Michael Ehrmann, Marcel Fratzscher, Refet S. Gürkaynak, Eric T Swanson , Monday, September 17, 2007

The authors of DP6456 focus on the extent to which monetary union has led to the integration of financial markets across the euro area, and in particular investigate the effects of two dimensions: the unification of bond markets, and the anchoring of long-run inflation expectations.

Willem Buiter, Anne Sibert, Wednesday, May 3, 2006

The Maastricht Treaty’s Eurozone entry criteria were designed for slow-growing West European nations. They make no economic sense for the new EU members. These nations opted for stable exchange rates, so their inflation rates rose with energy prices and rapid productivity growth. Neither the ECB nor the Bank of England would try to control inflation and exchange rates simultaneously. Why should Eurozone aspirants be forced to do so?

Events