Emerging markets face their fifth consecutive year of slowing growth. This column examines the nature of the slowdown and appropriate policy responses. Repeated downgrades in long-term growth expectations suggest that the slowdown might not be simply a pause, but the beginning of an era of weak growth for emerging markets. The countries concerned urgently need to put in place policies to address their cyclical and structural challenges and promote growth.
M Ayhan Kose, Franziska Ohnsorge, Lei (Sandy) Ye, 07 January 2016
Joshua Aizenman, 03 January 2016
The Global Crisis renewed debate on the benefits and limitations of coordinating international macro policies. This column highlights the rare conditions that lead to international cooperation, along with the potential benefits for the global economy. In normal times, deeper macro cooperation among countries is associated with welfare gains of a second-order magnitude, making the odds of cooperation low. When bad tail events induce imminent and correlated threats of destabilised financial markets, the perceived losses have a first-order magnitude. The apprehension of these losses in times of peril may elicit rare and beneficial macro cooperation.
Alessandra Bonfiglioli, Gino Gancia, 19 December 2015
The Great Recession highlighted the prominent role that economic uncertainty plays in hindering investment and growth. This column provides new evidence that economic uncertainty can actually play a positive role by promoting the implementation of structural reforms with long-run benefits. The effect appears to be strongest for countries with poorly informed voters. These findings suggest that times of uncertainty may present an opportunity to implement reforms that would otherwise not be passed.
Koji Nomura, 18 December 2015
Though Asian economies have maintained stable growth since 2010, their overall economic performance has slowed down compared to the peak in the 2000s. This column discusses the recent productivity trends in the Asian region and argues that the reason for the slowdown has been the end of China’s economic boom. Asian countries must undertake initiatives for achieving sustainable improvement of TFP across the region.
Nikolaos I. Papanikolaou, Christian C. P. Wolff, 06 December 2015
In the years running up to the global crisis, the banking sector was marked by a high degree of leverage. Using US data, this column shows how, before the onset of the crisis, banks accumulated leverage both on and, especially, off their balance sheets. The latter activities saw an increase in maturity mismatch, raised the probability of bank runs, and increased both individual bank risk and systemic risk. These findings support the imposition of an explicit off-balance sheet leverage ratio in future regulatory frameworks.
John C. Williams, 26 November 2015
Interest rates have been extremely low since the Global Crisis. This column surveys the recent debate over whether they will remain low, or return to normal. While an unequivocal answer is not possible, the evidence suggests a significant decline in average real rates – perhaps to as low as 1%.
Christopher J. Ruhm, 29 October 2015
Conventional wisdom tells us that health deteriorates when the economy weakens and improves when it strengthens. Some research tentatively agrees, but there is a marked dearth of challenges and robust research. This column presents new evidence suggesting that the reductions in mortality occurring during typical economic downturns also occur in periods of crisis, adding useful caveats for different types of downturns and crises.
Jon Danielsson, Morgane Fouché, Robert Macrae, 20 October 2015
There has always been conflict between macro- and microeconomic regulation. Microeconomic policy reigns supreme during good times, and macro during bad. This column explains that while the macro and micro objectives have always been present in regulatory design, their relative importance has varied according to the changing requirements of economic, financial and political cycles. The conflict between the two seems set to deepen and so, regardless of which ‘wins’, policymakers must not undermine the central bank's execution of monetary policy.
Thorsten Beck, José-Luis Peydró, 07 September 2015
The past five years have given European countries useful insights on what works in crisis resolution. The lessons should be viewed as forward-looking contributions to the institutional and policy reform agenda in Europe, especially in the Eurozone. The Eurozone is not doomed, it just needs better economic and financial policies.
Nathan Sussman, Osnat Zohar, 16 September 2015
The 2014 decline in oil prices lowered short-run inflation. Before the Global Crisis, the medium-term correlation between oil prices and inflation was weak, but it has become much stronger since the onset of the Crisis. This column suggests that following the onset of the Crisis, inflation expectations reacted quite strongly to global demand conditions and oil supply shocks. The public’s belief in the ability of monetary authorities to stabilise inflation at the medium-term horizon has deteriorated.
Donato Masciandaro, Davide Romelli, 28 August 2015
Since the onset of the Global Crisis, a number of central bank reforms have been implemented. This column suggests that since the Crisis, a silent restoration towards lower central bank independence might have been in place. The trend is more pronounced in non-OECD countries and, in particular, for the level of operational independence. The findings suggest that governments might be willing to trade off central bank independence to cope with concerns regarding financial stability, high debt and unemployment levels.
Xavier Freixas, Luc Laeven, José-Luis Peydró, 05 August 2015
There has been much talk about using macroprudential policy to manage systemic risk and reduce negative spillovers, but there is little agreement on how it could be operationalised. This column highlights the findings of a new book on the topic and offers a framework for operationalising macroprudential policy. Macroprudential measures, together with higher capital requirements, could be used to tame the build-up of leverage and credit booms in order to prevent financial crises.
Esa Jokivuolle, Jussi Keppo, Xuchuan Yuan, 23 July 2015
Bankers’ compensation has been indicted as a contributing factor to the Global Crisis. The EU and the US have responded in different ways – the former legislated bonus caps, while the latter implemented bonus deferrals. This column examines the effectiveness of these measures, using US data from just before the Crisis. Caps are found to be more effective in reducing the risk-taking by bank CEOs.
Jakob de Haan, Dirk Schoenmaker, 06 July 2015
The financial crisis brought with it many challenges, both to prevailing disciplinary tenets, and for research and policy more generally. This column outlines the lessons that can be drawn from the financial crisis – issues like financial market failures, macro-prudential policy, structural changes of the financial system, and the European banking union. It argues for the inclusion of these topics in curricula for the next generation of finance students.
Jonathan Ashworth, Charles A.E. Goodhart, 28 April 2015
When panic strikes, people tend to withdraw cash. While there were upticks in currency-to-deposit ratios in the autumn of 2008 and early 2009, they were modest and very short-lived compared to the Great Depression. This column argues that leading central banks learnt from the 1930s mistakes and acted decisively to check the panic. Key policies were the existence and upgrading of deposit insurance schemes, massive liquidity injections, and rapid cutting of interest rates. The most important were the guarantees that the biggest banks wouldn’t fail.
Donato Masciandaro, Davide Romelli, 26 April 2015
In the aftermath of the Global Crisis, many countries increased their central banks’ involvement in financial supervision. This column uses a novel dataset to argue that financial crises episodes significantly increase the probability of reforms in the financial structure. More interestingly, the authors find evidence of a ‘bandwagon effect’ by showing that politicians are more likely to undertake reforms when their peers do so.
Tito Boeri, Pietro Garibaldi, Espen R. Moen, 19 March 2015
The Great Recession sparked the interest in the link between financial conditions and employment. This column describes results from a new model of labour and finance, incorporating financial imperfections and borrowing constraints. The results uncover a complementarity between firms holding cash and labour market imperfections. Firms embedded into better functioning financial sectors are, on average, less inclined to hold cash. In addition, a more financially integrated system would dismiss more labour, explaining the higher increase of unemployment in the US compared to Europe.
Anusha Chari, Peter Blair Henry, 06 March 2015
In the wake of the Great Recession, a contentious debate has erupted over whether austerity is helpful or harmful for economic growth. This column compares the experiences of the East Asian countries – whose leaders responded to the East Asian financial crisis with expansionary fiscal policy – with those of the European periphery countries during the Great Recession. The authors argue that it was a mistake for the European periphery countries to pivot from fiscal expansion to consolidation before their economies had recovered.
Giuseppe Bertola, Anna Lo Prete, 28 February 2015
The large international imbalances accumulated in the Eurozone have proven difficult to unwind during the recent Crisis. This column argues that market reforms had a role in generating current account imbalances, and that patterns of relative labour market regulation could be equally important in the aftermath of the Crisis.
Pınar Yeşin, 21 February 2015
Safe haven inflows to Switzerland during global turmoil have been mentioned numerous times by the financial press and international organisations. However, recent research cannot find evidence for surges of capital inflows to Switzerland. In fact, this column argues that private capital inflows to and outflows from Switzerland have become exceptionally muted and less volatile since the Crisis. By contrast, net private capital flows have shown significantly higher volatility since the Crisis, frequently registering extreme movements. However, these extreme movements in net flows are not driven by surges of inflows.