The size and volatility of capital flows to developing countries have increased significantly in recent years (Figure 1), leading many economists to argue that national policies and multilateral institutions are needed to govern these flows (Forbes and Klein 2013, Blanchard and Ostry 2012).
Do capital controls deflect capital flows?
Paolo Giordani, Michele Ruta, Hans Weisfeld, Ling Zhu, 23 June 2014
Capital controls in the 21st century
Barry Eichengreen, Andrew K Rose, 5 June 2014
Capital controls are back. The IMF (2012) has softened its earlier opposition to their use. Some emerging markets – Brazil, for example – have made renewed use of controls since the global financial crisis of 2008–2009.
For a few dollars more: Reserves and growth in times of crises
Matthieu Bussière, Gong Cheng, Menzie D. Chinn , Noëmie Lisack, 16 March 2014
In the decade preceding the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC), emerging market economies accumulated large stocks of international reserves (see Figure 1). The unprecedented pace of reserve accumulation was at least partly a response to the lessons drawn from previous financial crises, which predominantly affected emerging markets.
Policymaking in crises: Pick your poison
Kristin Forbes, Michael W Klein, 24 December 2013
In 2010, the Brazilian finance minister Guido Mantenga declared a ‘currency war’ because of the harmful effects of the strengthening of the real. He blamed the currency’s appreciation on easy money in advanced countries, and to a lesser extent on reserve accumulation in some emerging markets.
Tapering talk: The impact of expectations of reduced Federal Reserve security purchases on emerging markets
Barry Eichengreen, Poonam Gupta, 19 December 2013
In May 2013, Federal Reserve officials first began to talk of the possibility of the US central bank tapering its securities purchases from $85 billion a month to something lower. A milestone to which many observers point is 22 May 2013, when Chairman Bernanke raised the possibility of tapering in his testimony to Congress.
Capital controls and the resolution of failed cross-border banks: The case of Iceland
Friðrik Már Baldursson, Richard Portes, 12 November 2013
A large amount of carry trade was drawn to Iceland in the boom leading up to the crisis of early October 2008 (Danielsson and Arnason 2011, Baldursson and Portes 2013a). As pressure mounted on the Icelandic banks, investors increasingly chose to exit the krona, which depreciated by 25% during the week before the banks collapsed. As the banks went down, the krona depreciated even further.
Independent monetary policies, synchronised outcomes
Espen Henriksen, Finn Kydland, Roman Šustek, 2 October 2013
The recession in the Eurozone has given new life to optimal-currency-area thinking. The argument goes that the disadvantages of a single currency come from the loss of flexibility and ability to use monetary policy to respond to “asymmetric shocks” (Krugman and Obstfeld 2009).
Is there a dilemma with the Trilemma?
Michael W Klein, Jay C. Shambaugh , 27 September 2013
In the Handbook of Safeguarding Global Financial Stability, the chapter “Capital Mobility and Exchange Rate Regimes” begins “Forced to state all the insights of international macroeconomics while standing on one leg, one could do worse than raise a foot off the ground and say something like:
Dilemma not Trilemma: The global financial cycle and monetary policy independence
Hélène Rey, 31 August 2013
Looking at the evolution of financial integration over the past half‐century in the world economy, one might conclude that financial openness is an irresistible long-run trend, hailed by policymakers and academic economists alike. Both emerging markets and advanced economies have increasingly opened their borders to financial flows.
The capital controls in Cyprus and the Icelandic experience
Jon Danielsson, 28 March 2013
The Cypriot government, European authorities and the IMF have concluded that capital controls are the best way to prevent a total collapse of the Cypriot financial system. Motivated by the obvious fear that anybody with money left over in Cyprus will seek to take their money out as soon as possible, temporary capital controls are to be put in place to prevent this.
- A tale of two depressions: What do the new data tell us? February 2010 updateEichengreen, O’Rourke
- Educated in America: College graduates and high school dropoutsHeckman, LaFontaine
- Eurozone breakup would trigger the mother of all financial crisesEichengreen
- Panic-driven austerity in the Eurozone and its implicationsDe Grauwe, Ji
- Debt, deleveraging, and the liquidity trap: A new modelKrugman
Cadot, de Melo, 16 June 2014
CEPR Policy Research
- The buyer margins of firms' exportsCarballo, Ottaviano, Volpe
- Commodity and Equity Markets: Some Stylized Facts from a Copula ApproachDelatte, Lopez
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- Finance and Poverty: Evidence from IndiaAyyagari, Beck, Hoseini
- The Manipulation of Basel Risk-WeightsMariathasan, Merrouche
- The economics of Scottish independence in an interdependent worldHughes Hallett
- Making city lights shine brighterYusuf, Leipziger
- The euro in the 'currency war'Bénassy-Quéré, Martin
- The roots of shadow bankingPerotti
- What’s wrong with Europe?Baldini, Manasse
- Corporate Finance Theory Symposium19 - 20 September 2014 / Cambridge / Judge Business School, Cambridge University
- International Trade, Finance, and Macroeconomics: Research Frontiers and Challenges for Policy18 - 19 December 2014 / The Bank of England, London / The Bank of England, Centre for Macroeconomics and CEPR