The recent financial crisis has shown that neglecting liquidity risks comes at substantial costs. In order to reinforce banks’ resilience to liquidity risks, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposed the introduction of two harmonised liquidity standards:
A call for liquidity stress testing and why it should not be neglected
Clemens Bonner, 6 February 2014
Falling short of expectations? Stress-testing the European banking system
Viral Acharya, Sascha Steffen, 17 January 2014
The Eurozone is mired in a recession. In 2013, the GDP of the 17 Eurozone countries fell by an average of 0.5%, and the outlook for 2014 shows considerable risks across the region. To stabilise the common currency area and its (partly insolvent) financial system, a Eurozone banking union is being established.
Why fiscal sustainability matters
Willem Buiter, 10 January 2014
Does fiscal sustainability matter only when there is a fiscal house on fire, as was the case with the Greek sovereign insolvency in 2011–12? Far from it.
Topics: Financial markets, Global crisis, International finance, Macroeconomic policy
Tags: balance-sheet recession, banking, banking union, banks, capital flows, credit booms, Currency wars, emerging markets, eurozone, Eurozone crisis, financial crisis, fiscal policy, fiscal sustainability, global financial crisis, sovereign debt, sovereign debt restructuring
Gambling for resurrection in Iceland
Friðrik Már Baldursson, Richard Portes, 6 January 2014
The demise of the three large Icelandic banks, just after the fall of Lehman Brothers, was a key event in the spread of the financial crisis. A couple of weeks before its collapse in October 2008, Kaupthing bank announced that the Qatari investor Sheikh Mohammed Bin Khalifa Bin Hamad al-Thani had bought a 5.01% stake. This briefly boosted market confidence in Kaupthing (Financial Times 2008).
Dark side of housing-price appreciation
Indraneel Chakraborty, Itay Goldstein, Andrew MacKinlay, 25 November 2013
Policymakers around the world often worry about decreases in real-estate prices and other asset prices, and take measures to prevent them. For example, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve has engaged in large-scale asset purchases – especially of mortgage-backed assets – to support the housing market and, in turn, the overall economy.
Good corporate governance is bad for bank capitalisation
Deniz Anginer, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Harry Huizinga, Kebin Ma, 10 November 2013
A failing bank can be defined as one that has insufficient capital. Bank capitalisation strategies thus are crucial in determining the probability of a bank failure. Confirming this, Berger and Bouwman (2013) find that higher levels of pre-crisis capital increase a bank’s probability of survival during a banking crisis.
A game changer: The EU banking recovery and resolution directive
Thomas Huertas, María J Nieto, 19 September 2013
To end moral hazard and “too big to fail”, investors, not taxpayers, should bear the loss associated with bank failures. Recently, ECOFIN took a major step in this direction. It agreed a common position with respect to the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive. If confirmed in the trialogue with the Commission and the European Parliament, the Directive will:
How much capital should banks have?
Lev Ratnovski, 28 July 2013
There is an active debate on how much capital banks should have. Yet establishing an 'optimal' level of bank capital is more art than science. Any conclusion is model-specific and contains a degree of judgement. The purpose of this column is to contribute to the debate by offering one more benchmark.
Supranational supervision: How much and for whom?
Thorsten Beck, Wolf Wagner, 20 July 2013
The question of how to regulate and supervise banks across countries has taken the centre stage in the debate on the reform of the banking sector. The failure of internationally active financial institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, and cross-border banks, such as Fortis, Dexia or the Icelandic banks, played a prominent role during the Global Crisis.
Everything the IMF wanted to know about financial regulation and wasn’t afraid to ask
Sheila Bair, 9 June 2013
I was honoured when the IMF asked me to moderate the Financial Regulation panel at this year’s Rethinking Macro II conference. And while naturally, I delivered one of the more enlightening and thought-provoking policy discussions of the conference, I did fail in my duties as moderator to make sure my panellists covered all the excellent questions our sponsors submitted to us.
- What good are children?Deaton, Stone
- Money makes people right-wing and inegalitarianOswald, Powdthavee
- Job polarisation and the decline of middle-class workers’ wagesBoehm
- Searching for sources of inequalityFurceri, Loungani
- Measuring economic progressCoyle
- A tale of two depressions: What do the new data tell us? February 2010 updateEichengreen, O’Rourke
- The ECB’s stealth bailoutSinn
- Educated in America: College graduates and high school dropoutsHeckman, LaFontaine
- Eurozone breakup would trigger the mother of all financial crisesEichengreen
- Panic-driven austerity in the Eurozone and its implicationsDe Grauwe, Ji
CEPR Policy Research
- The buyer margins of firms' exportsCarballo, Ottaviano, Volpe
- Commodity and Equity Markets: Some Stylized Facts from a Copula ApproachDelatte, Lopez
- Ethnic Unemployment Rates and Frictional MarketsGobillon, Rupert, Wasmer
- Finance and Poverty: Evidence from IndiaAyyagari, Beck, Hoseini
- The Manipulation of Basel Risk-WeightsMariathasan, Merrouche