A recent op-ed by a former Goldman Sachs employee has led to an outcry over two important themes which came to the fore during the crisis, ie corporate culture and incentives. This column argues that neither regulation nor market forces has put either of these issues to rest. It adds that bank complexity and the too-big-to-fail policy both serve to undermine market discipline.

Ever since public money was used to bail out banks, the public has been demanding change in the way they are run. This is particularly the case in the UK, where the Independent Banking Commission presents its final report today. If it calls for a breakup of Britain’s banks into deposit and investment banks, this column argues that to follow such advice would be a grave mistake.

At the centre of the global financial crisis was a housing boom and bust. This column continues the description of how flaws in the US housing finance sector made the crisis inevitable. Here the authors outline a reform plan to avoid this outcome and contrast it to the US Treasury proposals.

At the centre of the global financial crisis was a housing boom and bust. A New York University team has produced an excellent book on the flaws in the design of US housing finance that opened the door for the mayhem that followed. This column, the first of a series of two, describes the race to the bottom that occurred among Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the too-big-to-fail private financial institutions.

On 11 April, the Independent Commission on Banking in the UK, chaired by Oxford economist John Vickers, published its much-awaited interim report on reform options for British banking. This column argues that despite its critics, the policy proposals are a significant milestone not only for the UK, but for European and global banking reform.

Are banks too big to fail? This column suggests now is the time for Europeans to ask this question. It argues that given the potential risks to systemic stability, there is a case for policy action even in the absence of analytical certainty.

The problem of banks being too big to fail haunts discussions of regulation. This column provides new evidence on the implicit support provided to banks deemed too-difficult-to-fail and too-difficult-to-unwind in Europe and the US. It finds that regulators could be doing a much better job.

Financial reform is finally emerging in the major economies but these reforms come up short on one crucial aspect – the resolution of systematically important, i.e., ‘too complex to fail’, cross-border financial institutions. The latest Geneva Report on the World Economy advocates a two-tier solution to this problem – a universal approach for closely integrated countries such as EU members, and a modified universal approach for other countries.

The major economies' financial reforms come up short on one crucial aspect – the resolution of systematically important cross-border financial institutions. This column introduces the latest Geneva Report on the World Economy, which advocates a two-tier solution to this problem – a universal approach for closely integrated countries such as EU members and a modified universal approach for other countries. It explicitly rejects the territorial or go-it-alone approach.

Issues of banking stability are currently intensively debated in Germany and elsewhere. This column looks at German banks and suggests that privately-owned banks are more profitable and better capitalised than savings and cooperative banks, but also take more risk. This higher risk taking results in higher default probability and higher “proximity to insolvency” of privately-owned banks.