Joanne Lindley, Steven McIntosh, Sunday, September 21, 2014 - 00:00

Alex Edmans, Thursday, September 11, 2014 - 00:00

Alex Bryson, John Forth, Minghai Zhou, Tuesday, June 24, 2014 - 00:00

Publicly traded companies are the engine behind China’s growth, which raises the question of how CEO compensation works under an interventionist state. This column presents an analysis of executive compensation in China and a comparison to the West. Chinese listed firms have incentive structures similar to those of the US; in this case, effective compensation policies seem to transcend political boundaries.

Ian Gregory-Smith, Steve Thompson, Peter Wright, Monday, March 24, 2014 - 00:00

In 2003, the UK adopted a ‘say on pay’ policy, whereby quoted companies’ executive compensation offers have to be put to a shareholder vote. This column presents evidence that this policy has had a relatively modest impact on executive pay. A 10% increase in compensation is associated with an increase in shareholder dissent against the proposal of just 0.2%. However, remuneration committees representing the more highly rewarded CEOs are quite sensitive to dissent, provided it exceeds a critical threshold of about 10%. Shareholders do not appear more anxious about pay since the crisis.

Xavier Gabaix , Alex Edmans, Wednesday, June 24, 2009 - 00:00

Many blame executive compensation for encouraging shortsighted risk-taking. This column argues that compensation should be structured so as to provide incentives consistent with the firm’s position and long-term interest. It proposes “incentive accounts” that it says would be superior to existing compensation schemes.

CEPR Policy Research