Central banks today provide liquidity exclusively through purchases of (mostly) government bonds and through collateralised open-market operations. This column considers the evolution of liquidity provision by central banks over the past two centuries, and argues that there are alternative approaches to those that are focused on today. One such alternative is a revival of the 19th century practice of uncollateralised lending. This would discourage market participants from relying on informational shortcuts, and reduce the likelihood that informational shocks trigger collateral crises.
Clemens Jobst, Stefano Ugolini, Tuesday, June 23, 2015 - 00:00
Nicola Gennaioli, Alberto Martin, Stefano Rossi, Saturday, July 19, 2014 - 00:00
There is growing concern – but little systematic evidence – about the relationship between sovereign default and banking crises. This column documents the link between public default, bank bondholdings, and bank loans. Banks hold many public bonds in normal times (on average 9% of their assets), particularly in less financially developed countries. During sovereign defaults, banks increase their exposure to public bonds – especially large banks, and when expected bond returns are high. At the bank level, bondholdings correlate negatively with subsequent lending during sovereign defaults.
Petra Gerlach-Kristen, Robert McCauley, Kazuo Ueda, Wednesday, November 7, 2012 - 00:00
Do incidental large-scale bond purchases have a global portfolio balance effect? This column argues that one country’s bond purchases can ease monetary conditions abroad. Whether this effect is welcome depends on the phase of the business cycle, but the authors emphasise that it is of paramount importance for resolving the current crisis that Eurozone policymakers closely consider the effects of large-scale bond buying.
Jochen Andritzky, Sunday, August 5, 2012 - 00:00
Public debt held by non-residents has been on the rise over the last few decades – that is until the global crisis. This column looks at how the ownership of government bonds in the G20 and the Eurozone. It finds that increased foreign bondholders bring costs as well as benefits.
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Mitu Gulati, Monday, March 5, 2012 - 00:00
One of the most interesting questions arising from the ongoing Greek debt restructuring is what it implies about the feasibility of voluntary debt restructurings. Indeed, why would anyone voluntarily take a debt-exchange offer that promises a large reduction in repayments? This column argues creditors might feel safer with new debt instruments issued under English law than with old Greek-law regulated ones.
Tito Boeri, Tuesday, October 4, 2011 - 00:00
Today Italian five-year governments bonds are insured at 70 basis points above Spanish ones. In June it was the other way around. This column argues that this increase in Italian spreads is due not only to policy and communication failures but also to Berlusconi’s lack of personal credibility. The costs of such bad handling of the crisis could be of the order of €20 billion.
Silvia Sgherri, Edda Zoli, Tuesday, November 17, 2009 - 00:00
Can euro-area governments cushion the impact of the crisis without damaging market perceptions of their fiscal sustainability? This column suggests that euro-area sovereign spreads have typically reflected a common factor that mimics global risk repricing, not country-specific solvency concerns. But in the last year, market sentiments seem to have shifted to concerns about fragile national financial sectors and future debt dynamics.
Aviram Levy, Fabio Panetta, Tuesday, November 3, 2009 - 00:00
In December 2009, government guarantees on the issuance of bank bonds will close to new issuance in many EU countries. This column argues that the guarantees have been effective and should be extended into 2010, despite improved market conditions and bank profitability. In doing so, governments should correct the schemes for some distortionary effects and develop a careful exit strategy.
Leonardo Felli, Luca Anderlini, Saturday, August 22, 2009 - 00:00
Like flights, securities can be non-stop (direct claims) or they can involve (sometimes many) intermediate stops (indirect claims). How should we measure the vulnerability of different securities to "systemic risk"? This column proposes a simple index to capture the important information of interest to both regulators and investors.