Disclosure, transparency, and market discipline
Xavier Freixas, Christian Laux, 17 April 2012
Federal Open Market Committee forecasts: Guesses or guidance?
Peter Tillmann, 23 February 2012
Looking beyond the incumbent: The effects of exposing corruption on electoral outcomes
Ana De La O, Alberto Chong, Dean Karlan, Léonard Wantchékon, 23 January 2012
Vox readers can download CEPR Discussion Paper 8790 for free here.
Central banks’ voting records and future policy
Kateřina Šmídková, Jan Zapal, Roman Horváth, 13 November 2011
Monetary-policy transparency has several dimensions, such as volume, quality, and timeliness of disclosed information. Transparency-cautious central banks typically release the voting records from monetary-policy meetings together with the minutes.
The damaged ECB legitimacy
Anne Sibert, 15 September 2011
The ECB’s role has evolved in its decade-long existence. In this note I describe how the choices of the ECB have damaged the institution’s legitimacy.
Drawing a line under Europe’s crisis
Barry Eichengreen, 17 June 2010
Financial crises feed on uncertainty. The longer uncertainty is allowed to linger, the greater the damage to confidence and the more difficult it becomes to repair. It is essential therefore that European policymakers move decisively to draw a line under the crisis.
Extracting more from EITI
Helmut Reisen, Dilan Ölcer, 17 February 2009
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has been highly promoted as a tool for increasing transparency and curbing corruption, as part of the international soft law on which the international community increasingly relies (
Optimal central bank transparency
Carin van der Cruijsen, Sylvester Eijffinger, Lex Hoogduin , 12 August 2008
In recent decades, both monetary theory and monetary policymakers have come to emphasise the importance of expectations for the transmission of monetary policy.1 The New Keynesian model – more particularly the Phillips curve embedded in it – explains current inflation by the output gap and expected future inflation.
Central bank independence and transparency: Not just cheap talk (Part 2)
Christopher Crowe, Ellen E. Meade, 31 July 2008
Using the updated measures of central bank independence and transparency that we detailed in our first column, we sought to investigate what effects these aspects of central bank governance might have on economic performance.1
Central bank independence and transparency: Not just cheap talk (Part 1)
Christopher Crowe, Ellen E. Meade, 27 July 2008
In recent days, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has called for changes that would increase the accountability of the European Central Bank, including the publication of meeting minutes for its Governing Council.1 This and other types of accountability measures are gen
- Fiscal consolidation: At what speed?Blanchard, Leigh
- Public debt and economic growth, one more timePanizza, Presbitero
- Escaping liquidity traps: Lessons from the UK’s 1930s escapeCrafts
- The lessons of the North Atlantic crisis for economic theory and policyStiglitz
- Do entrepreneurs matter?Becker, Hvide
- A tale of two depressions: What do the new data tell us? February 2010 updateEichengreen, O’Rourke
- Educated in America: College graduates and high school dropoutsHeckman, LaFontaine
- Eurozone breakup would trigger the mother of all financial crisesEichengreen
- Debt, deleveraging, and the liquidity trap: A new modelKrugman
- Panic-driven austerity in the Eurozone and its implicationsDe Grauwe, Ji
Reichlin, Baldwin, 14 April 2013