Current-account rebalancing and international transfers (immaculate or not)
Giancarlo Corsetti, Philippe Martin, Paolo Pesenti, 31 January 2013
Current-account imbalances in Europe are at the heart of the crisis .This column argues that relative price adjustment need not be as dramatic as some observers claim. In order to foster rebalancing, policy should target obstacles to firms' entry, startup costs, and the incentives for product differentiation, letting relative prices and wages adjust in equilibrium. Setting up firms and new production lines is costly and in the current circumstances, policy should also address tight credit constraints on investment and firms’ activity.
Current-account imbalances in Europe are at the heart of the crisis, and rebalancing must therefore be part of the crisis resolution. How will this rebalancing take place? The view of many observers is that, given that it is difficult to envisage large changes in real exchange rates in the Eurozone, the outlook looks bleak.
Reducing the frequency of electoral cycles in the EU: A proposal for synchronising national and European elections
Giorgio Basevi, 23 January 2013
Is European economic recovery being delayed by political procrastination? Are electoral cycles hindering a return to growth? This column argues that by synchronising European nations’ electoral cycles (along with those of the European Parliament), Europe can avoid its current slow and jittery approach. Creating a synchronised Europe-wide voting period would do away with overlapping national electoral cycles. A common national and European voting period would reduce political uncertainty, ensuring quicker policymaking response times for a smoother, quicker route to recovery.
One of the immediate causes of the Greek crisis was the interplay between the electoral cycle in Greece and the discovery that the publication of statistical data on the Greek government financial accounts had been manipulated for political reasons.
All G7 economies are struggling in the post-crisis climate, but US GDP has recovered to pre-crisis levels, while the Eurozone simply hasn’t. This column portrays the global crisis as a transitory shock for the US, but as a quasi-permanent shock for Europe. The policies that are needed get the Eurozone back on track do not seem to be politically feasible. As tension rises with every quarter of stagnation, prospects for the survival of the euro are not only not improving, they are actually getting worse.
Despite apparent calm on the financial markets, no illusions that the storm is ending soon should be entertained. Indeed, we may well be in the eye of the hurricane.
Financial market quiescence has removed pressure for immediate policy action on the Eurozone crisis. This column argues that while important repairs were made in 2012, the most difficult ones still lie ahead. Much remains to be done by unwilling politicians. Things will have to get worse before they get better. The best hope is that this happens in 2013 rather than in 2014.
The situation of the Eurozone is now becoming clearer. This article lists ten observations and draws five consequences. The bottom line is that, even though some important steps were taken in 2012, the most difficult ones still lie ahead. Much remains to be done by unwilling politicians. So, regrettably, things will have to get worse before they get better.
Roel Beetsma, Konstantinos Mavromatis, 21 December 2012
Are Eurobonds a desirable solution to Eurozone members’ debt crises? Unhappily, it’s difficult to say. This column argues it very much depends on how the system is designed. However, looking at the most prominent proposals, it seems a cleverly designed Eurobonds system may well provide governments with the right incentives to encourage both issuing less debt and pursuing meaningful structural reform.
The debt crisis in Eurozone southern states has given rise to a number of measures to strengthen fiscal governance in Europe. It has also sped up plans for further integration of policymaking in the Eurozone.
True independence for the ECB: Triggering power - no more, no less
Markus K Brunnermeier, Hans Gersbach, 20 December 2012
As governments and the EU wring their hands over banking reform, a fragile system remains in place. This column argues that the ECB’s current role undermines its independence. What the Eurozone needs to reduce undue forbearance - while preserving the ECB's independence - is a ‘diarchy’ in which both a newly built Restructuring Authority and the ECB have the power to trigger bank-restructuring.
Governments are hesitating over how to resolve the financial distress of banks, leaving fragile banking structures in place. This problem is particularly pressing in the Eurozone; governments expect the ECB to continue providing cheap funding, undermining the bank’s independence.
Fears of an imminent Greek exit from the Eurozone have subsided, for now. This column attempts to measure the probability of a Greek exit, finding that the changing fortunes of Greek political parties, and the possibility of an early election, mean that the risk of a Greek exit may actually be quite high. It suggests that, despite investors' efforts to measure political risk, a persistent sense of unease about the Eurozone’s future is set to continue into 2013 and that Eurozone financial assets will thus continue to embed significant risk premiums in the coming years.
Fears about a Greek exit from the Eurozone reached a peak around May 2012. At the time, the first round of the Greek election gave the populist Syriza party enough support for it to block the formation of reform and a bailout-friendly government.
Vicky Pryce interviewed by Romesh Vaitilingam, 7 Dec 2012
Vicky Pryce talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about her book, "Greekonomics: The euro crisis and why politicians don’t get it". They discuss the flaws in the original conception of the single currency, Greece’s dire recent economic experiences and how Greek and European policymakers have responded to the crisis. The interview was recorded at the Bristol Festival of Economics in late November 2012.