Banking crises and political survival over the long run – why Great Expectations matter
Jeffrey Chwieroth, Andrew Walter, 10 May 2013
The economic consequences of financial crises have been systematically explored. Their political consequences haven’t. This column argues that without paying attention to politics, crises will remain poorly understood. After all, politics shapes policy choices, market sentiment and, ultimately, economic outcomes. Evidence from the effects of banking crises over the past century show that crises have a dramatic impact on the survival prospects of governments.
The wave of banking and sovereign-debt crises that began in 2007 has had powerful and continuing economic consequences (IMF 2013a; 2013b). Economists have used long run historical data to investigate the economic aftermaths of financial crises, but we lack any equivalent panoramic analysis of the impact of crises on politics.
Hair of the dog that bit us: New and improved capital requirements threaten to perpetuate megabank access to a taxpayer put
Edward J Kane, 30 January 2013
Do financial institution managers only owe enforceable duties of loyalty, competence and care to their stockholders and explicit creditors, but not to taxpayers or government supervisors? This column argues that in the current information and ethical environments, regulating accounting leverage cannot adequately protect taxpayers from regulation-induced innovation. We ought to aim for establishing enforceable duties of loyalty and care to taxpayers for managers of financial firms. Authorities need to put aside their unreliable, capital proxy: they should measure, control, and price the ebb and flow of safety-net benefits directly.
Why scarce small and medium enterprise financing hinders growth in Latin America: A role for public policies
Rolando Avendaño, Niels Boehm, Elisa Calza, 27 January 2013
Small and medium-sized enterprises provide the vast majority of employment in developing countries and are keystones in the productive structures of emerging economies. This column argues that the growth of such firms is being hindered by scarce financing. Looking at Latin America, it is clear that public financial institutions are increasingly important in meeting credit demands. If emerging economies want to see long-term growth, there needs to be a comprehensive approach to reducing the ‘traditional’ barriers to small and medium enterprise financing.
Small and medium enterprises represent a significant share of emerging economies’ business fabric. Nevertheless, they continue to face multiple challenges in meeting their financing needs. Public financial institutions have come to play an active role in addressing these financing gaps through new operational mechanisms and adapted instruments.
Information asymmetry raises the cost of capital for corporations
James Choi, Hongjun Yan, 25 January 2013
Security-market regulations often seek to ensure that all investors have equal access to information about each company. But what are the actual costs of an unequal information playing field? This column reviews evidence from China, Finland, and the US, suggesting that information asymmetry raises companies’ cost of capital. This inhibits investment and thereby long-run economic growth.
Governments around the world try to level the information playing field among investors by regulating the disclosure of corporate information. But what is the cost of unequal access to information? In this column, we review evidence from the three most recent papers in this area.
The efficient market hypothesis – in various forms – is at the heart of modern finance and macroeconomics. This column argues that market efficiency is extremely unlikely even without frictions or irrationality. Why? Because there are multiple equilibria, only one of which is Pareto efficient. For all other equilibria, the whims of market participants cause the welfare of the young to vary substantially in a way they would prefer to avoid, if given the choice. This invalidates the first welfare theorem and the idea of financial market efficiency. Central banks should thus dampen excessive market fluctuations.
Writing in a review of Justin Fox’s book The Myth of the Efficient Market, Richard Thaler (2009) has drawn attention to two dimensions of the efficient markets hypothesis, what he refers to as:
Implementation of Basel III in the US will bring back the regulatory arbitrage problems under Basel I
Takeo Hoshi, 23 December 2012
Rejigging financial regulation is in vogue. But, in the world of international finance, how well do different regulatory systems join up? This column argues that the US Dodd Frank Act and Basel III are, in part, incompatible and that harmonising them may lead to unintended consequences. The US ought to tread carefully here but should also try hard to maintain the spirit of better financial regulation.
Robert Shiller interviewed by Romesh Vaitilingam, 27 Jul 2012
Robert Shiller of Yale University talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about his book, ‘Finance and the Good Society’, in which he argues that even after the crisis, rather than condemning finance, we need to reclaim it for the common good. They discuss financial innovation, personal morality, the importance of education, and the contribution that finance can make to our lives. The interview was recorded in Bristol in May 2012.