Forward guidance in the UK
Spencer Dale, James Talbot 13 September 2013
The Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee has recently provided some explicit forward guidance regarding the future conduct of monetary policy in the UK. This column by the Bank's Chief economist explains how the MPC designed its forward guidance to respond to the unprecedented challenges facing the UK economy and argues that forward guidance allows the MPC to explore the scope for economic expansion without putting price and financial stability at risk.
At its meeting on 1 August 2013, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) agreed to provide state-contingent forward guidance concerning the future conduct of monetary policy. The aim was to provide more information to help financial markets, households and businesses understand the conditions under which the current stance of monetary policy would be maintained.
monetary policy, Central Banks, Bank of England, forward guidance
“Mensch tracht, und Gott lacht” – what’s the best guidance on monetary policy?
David Miles 22 October 2014
Many central banks embrace forward guidance by announcing expected interest rate paths. But how likely it is that actual rates will be close to expected ones? This column argues that quantifying such uncertainty poses great difficulties. Precise probability statements in a world of uncertainty (not just risk) can be misleading. It might be better to rely on qualitative guidance such as: “Interest rate rises will probably be gradual and likely to be to a level below the old normal”.
“Mensch tracht, und Gott lacht” is a Yiddish proverb – men plan and God laughs. Woody Allen puts the same thought this way: “If you want to make God laugh tell him about your plans”. Some people might see these words as a fitting epitaph for forward guidance on monetary policy. The Bank of England has certainly faced a good deal of criticism for the guidance that it has recently been giving, as has the Federal Reserve in the US.
forward guidance, unconventional monetary policy, monetary policy, Central Banks, central bank communication, interest rates, uncertainty
‘Leaning against the wind’: exchange rate intervention in emerging markets works
Christian Daude, Eduardo Levy Yeyati 01 September 2014
Central banks’ exchange rate interventions are typically attributed to precautionary, prudential, or mercantilist motives. This column documents the prevalence of an alternative motive – that of stabilising the exchange rate – in emerging markets, where, despite heavy intervention, the Global Crisis saw important deviations of the real exchange rate from its equilibrium value. Exchange rate intervention is shown to be effective, but more so at containing appreciations than depreciations.
The economic debate has typically downplayed the exchange rate-smoothing nature of central bank foreign exchange intervention, attributing it to precautionary or prudential motives, or to the goal of keeping the exchange rate undervalued for mercantilist reasons.
Exchange rates Monetary policy
Central Banks, exchange rates, exchange rate smoothing, emerging markets, Leaning against the wind
Lessons for rescuing a SIFI: The Banque de France’s 1889 ‘lifeboat’
Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur, Angelo Riva, Eugene N. White 02 July 2014
The key challenge for lenders of last resort is to ameliorate financial crises without encouraging excessive risk-taking. This column discusses the lessons from the Banque de France’s successful handling of the crisis of 1889. Recognising its systemic importance, the Banque provided an emergency loan to the insolvent Comptoir d’Escompte. Banks that shared responsibility for the crisis were forced to guarantee the losses, which were ultimately recouped by large fines – notably on the Comptoir’s board of directors. This appears to have reduced moral hazard – there were no financial crises in France for 25 years.
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 set out to limit the authority of the Federal Reserve to rescue insolvent financial institutions. Since 1932, Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act had given the agency the power to lend to “any individual partnership, or corporation” in “unusual and exigent circumstances.” The 2010 Act now compels the Fed to consult with the Secretary of the Treasury before implementing a new lending program.
Economic history Financial markets
Central Banks, financial crises, moral hazard, lender of last resort, bailout, bank runs, SIFIs, central banking, Banque de France
TARGET balances, Bretton Woods, and the Great Depression
Michael Bordo 21 March 2014
Since 2007, there has been a buildup of TARGET imbalances within the Eurosystem – growing liabilities of national central banks in the periphery matched by growing claims of central banks in the core. This column argues that, rather than signalling the collapse of the monetary system – as was the case for Bretton Woods between 1968 and 1971 – these TARGET imbalances represent a successful institutional innovation that prevented a repeat of the US payments crisis of 1933.
During the Eurozone crisis, an analogy was made between the events in Europe between 2007 and 2012 and the collapse of the Bretton Woods System between 1968 and 1971. There has been a build-up of TARGET liabilities since 2007 by some central banks (notably Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, or the ‘GIPS’), and of TARGET assets by Germany and others.
Economic history International finance
ECB, eurozone, euro, global imbalances, Central Banks, financial crisis, Great Depression, Eurosystem, Eurozone crisis, Bretton Woods, TARGET
Single supervision and resolution rules: Is ECB independence at risk?
Donato Masciandaro, Francesco Passarelli 21 December 2013
During the Great Moderation, central banks focused on price stability, and independence was seen as crucial to limit inflation bias. Since the Global Financial Crisis, emergency support measures for banks, and central banks’ increasing involvement in supervision, have called central bank independence into question. This column argues that the literature has overlooked the distributional effects of the tradeoff between monetary and financial stability. In a political economy framework, heterogeneity in voters’ portfolios can cause the degree of central bank independence to differ from the social optimum.
A successful transition to a European Banking Union requires robust and credible ‘Chinese walls’ between the ECB’s role as monetary authority and any responsibility in the Single Supervisory Mechanism or in the resolution rules. Otherwise, the ECB’s independence would be at risk, given that monetary policy would likely have larger distributional effects.
EU institutions Financial markets
ECB, Central Banks, central bank independence, global financial crisis, banking regulation, bank resolution, banking union
Regulation, supervision and the role of central banks
The Editors 20 December 2013
Maintaining financial stability is a major concern and central banks have been increasingly involved in assuring it. This column introduces a CEPR Policy Insight written by Italy’s central bank governor on the post-Crisis role of central banks in financial regulation and supervision.
The 2008 Global Crisis consisted of a financial crisis in the North Atlantic economies and a trade and expectations crisis in the rest of the world. Five years on, US and European policymakers as still struggling to put in place regulation and supervision regimes aimed at avoiding future crises.
Central Banks, financial regulation, financial supervision
International cooperation and central banks
Harold James 08 October 2013
The global nature of the recent financial crisis required a coordinated response from central banks. After the fall of Lehman Brothers, several of them simultaneously reduced their policy rates, and the Fed extended dollar swap lines to its overseas counterparts. However, the second phase of the crisis has put increasing strain on international cooperation. This column presents two explanations. First, the Eurozone crisis threatens the solvency of governments, thus creating conflict over who will pay the costs of maintaining financial stability. Second, unconventional monetary policy has had spillover effects in developing countries.
Tackling the aftermath of a major financial crisis, the origins of which lie in ‘global imbalances’ and whose transmission mechanisms are cross-national, seems prima facie to demand more substantial and institutionalised cooperation. However, in the five years since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, visions of what central banks can and should do have changed profoundly. In particular, the demand that they should play a much more vigorous and preemptive role in financial supervision has had made them more nationally focused and in consequence less prone to cooperate.
Global crisis International finance
monetary policy, global imbalances, Central Banks, global crisis, policy coordination, Eurozone crisis
Independent monetary policies, synchronised outcomes
Espen Henriksen, Finn Kydland, Roman Šustek 02 October 2013
The monetary policy for Eurozone members is one-size-fits-all in an economic area rife with economic differences. Does this really make a difference? This column argues that even if each EZ member state had a fully independent monetary authority, monetary policies would likely still appear highly synchronised across EZ members.
The recession in the Eurozone has given new life to optimal-currency-area thinking. The argument goes that the disadvantages of a single currency come from the loss of flexibility and ability to use monetary policy to respond to “asymmetric shocks” (Krugman and Obstfeld 2009). The often-unarticulated presumption is that countries with independent monetary policies would make different policy decisions as long as contemporaneous shocks to output and employment were asymmetric.
Exchange rates Monetary policy
inflation, monetary policy, EMU, Central Banks, capital controls, exchange-rate policy
Should Brazil’s central bank be selling foreign reserves?
Márcio Garcia 25 September 2013
The recent reversal of capital flows to emerging markets raises the question of whether and how to intervene in currency markets. Brazil’s central bank has intervened heavily, spending more than $50 billion and promising to double that by the end of the year. However, almost all of that intervention has taken place in onshore derivative markets that settle in real. This column argues that such interventions can be effective, but that central banks must stand ready to use their foreign-exchange reserves if necessary.
The US dollar’s rise in August and the Brazilian Central Bank’s (BCB) interventions in forex markets have started a debate about whether the BCB should keep on intervening as it has been doing, mostly via currency derivatives markets, or if it should also be selling its international reserves.
Exchange rates International finance
exchange rates, Central Banks, capital flows, derivatives, Brazil