The crisis has highlighted the need for, and difficulties with, a Eurozone banking union. This column argues that, to make a union, you need three crucial ingredients: common supervision, a single resolution mechanism, and common safety nets. The power to control and the resources to rescue must work in parallel. Eurozone leaders have taken the first critical steps, but further progress is needed to strengthen the financial architecture of the single currency.

The Monday morning Eurozone Cyprus bailout is now public, although details are scant. This column argues that this package cancels out some of the mistakes in last week’s package. Last week, the Troika should have vetoed the small-deposit tax and prepared a plan B for the Cypriot parliament’s rejection. Avoiding the risky scenario of a Cyprus exit will require further fiscal commitments from Eurozone partners. One possibility is a temporary, but EZ-wide, 'deposit reinsurance', or backing of national deposit-guarantee schemes by the ESM.

So far, discussions around Europe’s prospective banking union have focused only on the supervision of banks. This column argues that policymakers must also think about the resolution of banks in distress. While national governments confine themselves to the domestic effects of a banking failure, a European Resolution Authority could incorporate domestic and cross-border effects. A cost-benefit analysis of a hypothetical resolution of the top 25 European banks shows that the UK, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands would be the main winners.

Can the euro exist without fiscal or political union? This column draws on the history of the US – especially its assumption of states’ debt after the War of Independence – to investigate which path might best serve the Eurozone. History tells us that unions require a well-constitutionalised system of restraint on fiscal behaviour, both at the federal level and at that of individual states.

Do economists and policymakers know how to design a federal bank for Europe? Is there a template? This column explores the history of the US Federal Reserve, gleaning lessons for the future of the European banking system. Getting to grips with the historical and empirical details shows how different the two really are. Overall, evidence suggests that the mechanism of the TARGET system might well create demand for Europe to move further towards fiscal federalism.

As governments and the EU wring their hands over banking reform, a fragile system remains in place. This column argues that the ECB’s current role undermines its independence. What the Eurozone needs to reduce undue forbearance - while preserving the ECB's independence - is a ‘diarchy’ in which both a newly built Restructuring Authority and the ECB have the power to trigger bank-restructuring.

The crisis has shown how the Eurozone needs instruments to control bank-funding risks, as implementation of the necessary prudential legislation at the EU level has been much postponed. This column argues that the delay creates a precarious situation, especially in the Eurozone where a banking union is been introduced. Currently all liquidity policy is at the national level. Without some form of coordination, this shift all bank funding risk to ultimate ECB support without the Single Supervisory Mechanism having any adequate transition tools.

Eurozone banking union discussions are full of questions about the scope of Eurozone microprudential bank supervision. Yet, this column argues that there is surprisingly little debate on the macroprudential supervision that is necessary to safeguard the wider European financial system. After all it is macro developments, such as fast rising housing prices, that lie at the heart of the ongoing crisis in Europe. To safeguard the financial system, Eurozone macroprudential tools should be under the ECB, separate from microprudential functions, with input from national central banks when differentiation is necessary.

The crisis has revealed the vulnerabilities of the Eurozone financial sector and the critical role the sector plays in the real economy. It also made it clear that the Eurozone banking system needs fixing. But what reforms should we implement? It is critical that much better legislation be both discussed and implemented if we wish to properly regulate the financial sector. This column opens a Vox debate on banking reform whose aim is to stimulate an open and broad-ranging discussion on banking reform.

An integrated banking system saved Nevada after a local real estate boom turned to bust. Without an integrated banking system, the same wasn’t true of Ireland. This column argues that comparing Ireland and Nevada shows that banking union is far more important for Europe than current proposals of fiscal union. And, in the absence of a proper banking union that covers losses, it seems ever more likely that Europe will be pushed back towards nationally segmented financial markets.