One of the primary purposes of bank capital is to absorb losses. Where bank capital holdings are insufficient to absorb losses, banks will either fail or – if bank failure is deemed too costly for the economy – be bailed out. In practice, banks frequently receive public funds where capital holdings are insufficient to cover losses in order to prevent bank failure.
Bank capital requirements: Risk weights you cannot trust and the implications for Basel III
Jens Hagendorff, Francesco Vallascas, 16 December 2013
The Manipulation of Basel Risk-Weights
Mike Mariathasan, Ouarda Merrouche, 26 May 2013
Vox readers can download Discussion Paper 9494 for free here.
The prudential treatment of trade finance under Basel III: For a fair treatment
Marc Auboin, 7 March 2010
There was a time when trade finance received favourable regulatory treatment. It was viewed as one of the safest, most collateralised, and self-liquidating forms of finance.
Mitigating the procyclical effects of bank capital regulation
Rafael Repullo, Jesús Saurina, Carlos Trucharte, 24 September 2009
The G20 April 2009 London Summit put forward recommendations “to mitigate procyclicality, including a requirement for banks to build buffers of resources in good times that they can draw down when conditions deteriorate.” Many proposals have been published since. On 3 September 2009, the US Treasury stated that the principal options were adopting either
It is time for a reappraisal of the basic principles of financial regulation
Hyun Song Shin, 31 January 2009
The regulatory system stands accused of having failed to provide any check or barrier against the boom-and-bust cycle in the financial system. It was largely a bystander during the build-up of leverage and the erosion of credit standards in the credit boom and has been largely powerless as the boom has turned to bust with a devastating impact on the real economy.
The procyclical effects of Basel II
Rafael Repullo, Javier Suarez, 14 July 2008
The global charter that regulates banks’ capital requirements – known as Basel II – aims to make each bank’s capital holdings proportional to its potential credit losses.1 The idea was to reduce the incentives for excessive risk-taking and the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage supposedly offered by the old regime – Basel I.
Filling the information gap
Alberto Giovannini, Luigi Spaventa, 5 November 2007
The mid-summer blues are not quite over yet: with subprime default rates still on the rise, 3-months interbank rates stay abnormally high, credit conditions remain tight, gross issues of mortgage-backed bonds and commercial paper are all but dried up, and banks lick their wounds and attempt to set up emergency vehicles to dispose of the backlog of illiquid assets left in their books.
- A tale of two depressions: What do the new data tell us? February 2010 updateEichengreen, O’Rourke
- The ECB’s stealth bailoutSinn
- Educated in America: College graduates and high school dropoutsHeckman, LaFontaine
- Eurozone breakup would trigger the mother of all financial crisesEichengreen
- Panic-driven austerity in the Eurozone and its implicationsDe Grauwe, Ji
DellaVigna, Durante, Knight, La Ferrara
Ostry, Berg, Tsangarides
Allen, Eichengreen, Evans
Greenwood, Guner, Kocharakov, Santos
CEPR Policy Research
- The buyer margins of firms' exportsCarballo, Ottaviano, Volpe
- Commodity and Equity Markets: Some Stylized Facts from a Copula ApproachDelatte, Lopez
- Ethnic Unemployment Rates and Frictional MarketsGobillon, Rupert, Wasmer
- Finance and Poverty: Evidence from IndiaAyyagari, Beck, Hoseini
- The Manipulation of Basel Risk-WeightsMariathasan, Merrouche
- Making city lights shine brighterYusuf, Leipziger
- The euro in the 'currency war'Bénassy-Quéré, Martin
- The roots of shadow bankingPerotti
- What’s wrong with Europe?Baldini, Manasse
- How the EZ crisis is permanently changing EU institutionsMicossi
- 21st Century Challenges: The Mobile Middle Class13 - 13 March 2014 / Royal Geographical