This weekend’s plan has been received positively by the markets, but it is too early to call it a success. Future monetary historians may judge it either a brilliant move or the first step on a slippery slope to ruin. The EU needs to set up an independent institution to vet fiscal plans of Eurozone governments and apply a sliding scale of sanctions. If the euro is to survive the current decade, Greece cannot happen again.

The European Stabilisation Mechanism is a major initiative, but is it enough? This column argues that more is needed. All EU bank supervisors should conduct stress tests to gauge their banks’ exposure to risky sovereign debt; those who fail should be re-capitalised or closed to ring-fence the problem. The ‘Mechanism’ should also be transformed into an institution that manages the Eurozone’s rescue contributions, supervises conditionality, and sets up mechanisms for orderly debt rescheduling should austerity programmes fail.

Eurozone membership seemed to shield economies with structural problems from the “original sin” – the obligation to borrow in foreign currency while the ability to pay is in domestic currency. This column argues that the sin is still with Greece and other Eurozone nations with weak institutions. Reforms that boost the nation’s competitiveness or the government’s fiscal positions reduce short-term government revenue directly or via a recession. Solving the problem will require coordinated Eurozone intervention to correct internal imbalances

EU and IMF efforts to rescue Greece have failed to stabilise Europe's financial markets. Now there are significant concerns about Spain and Portugal's financial circumstances. This column says Europe needs to wake up, face the facts, and take action. It outlines what the IMF, ECB, and Eurozone members need to do to prevent the crisis from spreading. It may be too late for Greece, but it is not too late for Europe.

As world markets continue to raise concerns about Eurozone countries, this column argues that the euro has been a failure. Why should money be poured into Greece to "save the euro"? Besides the moral hazard effects of the intervention, it makes little sense to prolong a monetary regime which is actually one of the reasons why these Eurozone countries are in trouble.

CEPR Policy Insight No. 47 argues that the benefits of a monetary union develop gradually over time and require policymakers to seize opportunities and perseverance in the face of adversity.

Why would countries share a single currency? This column introduces a new CEPR Policy Insight and argues that some aspects are missing in the current debate on the merits of the EMU. Benefiting from monetary union is a matter of time, perseverance, and seizing opportunities.

CEPR Policy Insight No. 48 attributes the Greek-linked difficulty largely to the claim by the ECB and government officials in Eurozone member countries that the Eurozone is founded on fiscal discipline and the Stability and Growth Pact.

How should the Eurozone deal with the Greek fiscal crisis? This column introduces a Policy Insight that attributes the Greek-linked difficulty largely to the claim by the ECB and government officials that the Eurozone is founded on fiscal discipline and the Stability and Growth Pact. To guarantee a long-run future for the Eurozone, a change of doctrine is critical.

If the US government does brand China as a “currency manipulator”, should the EU follow suit? This column argues that EU officials are likely to be low key on the issue. There are far too many imbalances within the EU, notably Germany’s trade deficit, so that any complaints about China are doomed to degenerate into intra-EU discord.