One of the many impacts of the Global Crisis was on stress levels, and these can be a risk factor for adverse birth outcomes. This column shows that exposure to the Crisis resulted in a significant reduction in the birth weight of babies in Iceland, comparable in size to the effect of smoking during pregnancy. The full costs of poor health at birth as a result of the Crisis will not materialise until the children exposed in utero become adults.
Arna Vardardottir, 23 March 2016
Thorvaldur Gylfason, 26 November 2015
Seven years after its crisis, Iceland has staged an economic recovery. This column suggests that despite its overall success, the current economic situation in Iceland is not devoid of problems. Insufficient competition in certain areas keeps real wages lower in Iceland compared to other Nordic countries. The current government in power seems not to have learned enough from the crash of 2008. Finally, Iceland still needs to bring to justice more of those responsible for breaking the law while breaking the banks.
Margarita Katsimi, Gylfi Zoega, 19 November 2015
Iceland and Greece were both seriously affected by the Global Crisis, yet their experiences with the implemented IMF programmes have been quite different. In Iceland the programme has been a success, whereas the one in Greece has been a failure. This column explains why this happened. First, Iceland’s external debt was de jure private, while Greece’s external debt was sovereign debt. Second, Iceland has its own currency, making it easy to create a current account surplus through a lower exchange rate. Finally, the government of Iceland took full ownership of the IMF programme, which was not the case in Greece.
Jon Danielsson, 13 August 2015
The Greek and the Icelandic crisis have much in common, not the least the heavy pressure from foreign countries and the hectoring from their public officials. In Iceland and in Greece this was counterproductive, hardening the opposition to any settlement. The will to reform needs to come from within, and the sooner the Troika realizes this, the easier it will be to deal with the Greek situation.
Stephen Kinsella, Hamid Raza, Gylfi Zoega, 04 July 2015
Iceland and Ireland were both rocked by the fallout of the Global Crisis. This column argues that differences in currency arrangements affected the mechanisms of the boom and the collapse. Iceland’s banks collapsed because they did not have a lender of last resort in euros. Ireland did. But Iceland’s collapse and ensuing capital controls shifted the burden of debt restructuring onto foreign creditors to a much greater extent than in Ireland.
Thorvaldur Gylfason, 16 April 2015
Whereas some argue there is no need to revise the US constitution, others believe that its inherent flaws are in the core of the US’ decreasing power. This column reviews four alleged flaws of the US constitution. There is a striking similarity in method and substance between current proposals for constitutional reform in the US and the post-crash constitutional reform process in Iceland presently held captive by parliament..
Friðrik Már Baldursson, Richard Portes, 06 January 2014
In 2008, Icelandic banks were too big to fail and too big to save. The government’s rescue attempts had devastating systemic consequences in Iceland since – as it turned out – they were too big for the state to rescue. This column discusses research that shows how this was a classic case of banks gambling for resurrection.
Friðrik Már Baldursson, Richard Portes, 12 November 2013
Iceland’s 2008 capital controls are still in place to prevent outflows of domestic holdings in failed cross-border banks. However, it is important for the country’s future economic prosperity to lift the capital controls without endangering financial stability. This column discusses the risks of capital controls and gives policy recommendations for cases of the three former major Icelandic banks.
Jon Danielsson, 21 May 2013
Icelandic voters recently ejected its post-Crisis government – a government that successfully avoided economic collapse when the odds were stacked against it. The new government comprises the same parties that were originally responsible for the Crisis. What’s going on? This column argues that this switch is, in fact, logical given the outgoing government’s mishandling of the economy and their deference towards foreign creditors.
Anne Sibert, 02 April 2013
Depositors in Eurozone banks are facing a steep learning curve on just exactly what deposit insurance means. This column points out that the precedents set in Cyprus and Iceland show that deposit insurance is only a legal commitment for small bank failures. In systemic crises, these are more political than legal commitments, so the solvency of the insuring government matters. A Eurozone-wide deposit-insurance scheme would change this.
This reposted column corrects an error, due to the editor, that was in the first posting.
Jon Danielsson, 28 March 2013
Cyprus has imposed temporary capital controls. This column sheds light on how temporary and how damaging they are likely to be, based on Iceland’s experience. The longer controls exist, the harder they are to abolish. Icelandic capital controls, which have been ‘temporary’ for half a decade, deeply damage the economy by discouraging investment. We can only hope the authorities that created the chaos in the first place realise that temporary really needs to mean temporary.
Thorvaldur Gylfason, 01 November 2012
Iceland is in the middle of a major constitutional overhaul. This column looks at the unorthodox use of a referendum in drafting the constitution and argues that this democratic element could lead to its long-term success.
Thorvaldur Gylfason, 11 April 2012
Most economists would agree that the global financial and economic crisis was at least partly caused by a failure in the regulation of the financial sector. While regulatory reform is now being debated throughout the world, critics argue that it is only a matter of time before any new regulations are removed by powerful interest groups. This column asks whether prompt corrective action belongs in constitutions.
Jon Danielsson, Ragnar Arnason, 14 November 2011
The IMF has emerged from the global crisis bigger and more powerful. But this column argues that the capital controls it required Iceland to adopt in 2008 are not of the soft and cuddly modern type that slow hot money flows. Instead they are akin to the draconian controls common in the 1950s. They violate the civil rights of Icelanders and significantly hamper economic growth.
Friðrik Már Baldursson, 08 November 2011
During the global crisis, Iceland was hit by the biggest banking crisis any country has ever suffered. This column reviews the role of the IMF in Iceland’s recovery. It argues that the IMF programme was not perfectly designed but successful. Iceland re-entered capital markets less than three years after the crisis.
Jon Danielsson, 27 October 2011
According to the IMF, Iceland has graduated from its Fund-supported programme with unqualified success. This column begs to differ.
Jon Danielsson, 26 October 2011
Much of macroeconomic policymaking is trial and error. This column discusses calamitous error on the part of Iceland’s policymakers, in the hope that others can at least try something else.
Thorvaldur Gylfason, 11 October 2011
As economic protests continue throughout Europe, many wonder whether such efforts will be in vain. This column explores what happened in Iceland, where a “pots-and-pans” revolution in response to the devastating financial crisis gave rise to demands for a new constitution.
Thorvaldur Gylfason, 01 June 2011
The global crisis has brought many countries to their knees, none more so than the small island of Iceland whose losses amount to seven times its GDP. Yet while Iceland’s recovery has in many ways been remarkable, this column argues that the country’s capital controls stand in the way of further progress.
Gylfi Zoega, Jon Danielsson, 27 April 2011
Icelanders have voted against providing a government guarantee for claims made by the UK and the Dutch governments against Iceland’s deposit insurance fund. This column argues that the heated debates surrounding the referendum may provide a glimpse into the challenges that lie ahead for European policymakers as they attempt to allocate losses suffered by banks between the taxpayers of different countries.