Credit markets play an increasingly central role in modern economies. Within the OECD, for instance, domestic credit has risen from 100% of GDP in 1970 to approximately 160% of GDP in 2012 (as measured by the Bank for International Settlements).
Managing credit bubbles
Alberto Martin, Jaume Ventura, 5 July 2014
Lessons for rescuing a SIFI: The Banque de France’s 1889 ‘lifeboat’
Pierre-Cyrille Hautcoeur, Angelo Riva, Eugene N. White, 2 July 2014
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 set out to limit the authority of the Federal Reserve to rescue insolvent financial institutions.
Incentives for avoiding delayed sovereign defaults
Ugo Panizza, 3 March 2013
The international financial architecture needs a structured mechanism for dealing with sovereign defaults. The main problem with the status quo is that countries tend to sub-optimally delay necessary defaults, leading to substantial loss of value for debtors and creditors alike.
Thanks to the ECB
Charles Wyplosz, 30 July 2012
On Thursday, the President of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, created a buzz by saying that the central bank “is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” This was enough to send the euro up and bond spreads down. But what was Draghi really saying? Very smart things, in fact, for the third time.
Procyclical bank risk-taking and the lender of last resort
Mark Mink, 31 August 2011
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007, and particularly since the bankruptcy of Lehman brothers in September 2008, central banks in their roles as lenders of last resort have provided large-scale liquidity support not only to individual banks, but also to the banking sector as a whole. As President Trichet of the European Central Bank explained in November 2009:
The European Central Bank as a lender of last resort
Paul De Grauwe, 18 August 2011
In October 2008 the ECB discovered that there is more to central banking than price stability. This discovery occurred when it was forced to massively increase liquidity to save the banking system. The ECB did not hesitate to serve as lender of last resort to the banking system, despite fears of moral hazard, inflation, and the fiscal implications of its lending.
Global safety nets: The IMF as a swap clearing house
Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Tito Cordella, 18 April 2010
The emerging members of the G20 are promoting the debate on global safety nets as a key topic for the next G20 meeting. While an international lender of last resort is more appealing to these countries than conditionality-heavy IMF-led packages, its practical advantages depend critically on a number of aspects that are sometimes downplayed in the policy discussion.
Who should decide on emergency liquidity assistance?
Jorge Ponce, 16 January 2010
Many countries are revising their institutions to deal with troubled banks. In the UK, the Labour Party believes that the current arrangement – the Tripartite Standing Committee constituted by the HM Treasury, the Bank of England, and the Financial Services Authority – is the best framework for regulating and supervising financial institutions and wants to strengthen it.
A stability pact à la Maastricht for emerging markets
Alejandro Izquierdo, Ernesto Talvi, 12 December 2009
One of the most intriguing puzzles following the Lehman debacle is that, in spite of its global nature, the current crisis dealt a much smaller blow to emerging markets than its predecessor, the Russian/Long-Term Capital Management crisis of 1998 (Levy-Yeyati 2009,
Crisis Management at Cross-Roads
16 November 2009 - 1 January 1970, Auditorium, National Bank of Belgium, BrusselsSUERF/CEPS/BFF Conference followed by SUERF Annual Lecture 2009 Sessions on:
- Provision of liquidity and Lender of Last Resort operations: effectiveness, governance, cross-border and cross currency issues
- Cross-border bank resolution
- Deposit guarantee schemes: How to re-establish clients’ confidence
- Limits of the "Lender of Last Resort", "Too big to fail" and "Too big to save" theses
- Michael Bailey
- Auditorium, National Bank of Belgium, Brussels
- Open attendance
- SUERF, CEPS and BFF
- More information:
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