Timothy J Hatton, Thursday, September 9, 2010

The recent recession that followed the global crisis has often been compared with the Great Depression. This column argues that an important but neglected lesson from that period is that policymakers should be firmly focused on fostering labour market flexibility and maintaining the employability of those out of work, rather than on short fixes that actually cause unemployment to persist.

Richard S. Grossman, Friday, July 23, 2010

Richard Grossman of Wesleyan University talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about his new book ‘Unsettled Account: The Evolution of Banking in the Industrialized World since 1800’. Among other things, they discuss the problems of striking a balance between a dynamic banking system and a stable banking system. The interview was recorded at a conference on ‘Lessons from the Great Depression for the Making of Economic Policy’ in London in April 2010.

Kris James Mitchener , Joseph Mason, Tuesday, June 15, 2010

Many commentators have compared the global crisis to the Great Depression. This column explores lessons that can be applied to help shape expectations and guide exit policy for central banks. It argues that the need for credit stimulus should end when failed intermediaries are resolved and positive net present value credits are reallocated to solvent lenders.

Price Fishback, Friday, April 30, 2010

Price Fishback of the University of Arizona talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about whether the current US economic situation is really comparable to the Great Depression. He argues that today’s monetary policy response is heavily and positively influenced by the failures of the past – but that today’s fiscal stimulus is far stronger than in the 1930s and out of proportion to the problem. The interview was recorded at a conference on ‘Lessons from the Great Depression for the Making of Economic Policy’ in London in April 2010.

Marc Flandreau, Norbert Gaillard, Ugo Panizza, Sunday, April 18, 2010

The global crisis is frequently compared to the Great Depression and the interwar debt crises. This column argues that, contrary to prevailing opinion, the interwar debt crisis had little to do with bankers’ conflicts of interest – intermediaries were in fact careful in selecting and placing sovereign bonds. Then, as now, public opinion may not be the best guide to policy.

Guillermo Calvo, Rudy Loo-Kung, Monday, April 12, 2010

The causes and consequences of the current global crisis have been compared with the Great Depression as well as crises in emerging markets. This column argues that the main difference between emerging market crises and the global crisis is that the former relied on an export recovery while the recent recovery has been fuelled by far less sustainable government expenditure.

Eugene N. White, Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Where do the real causes of the global financial crisis lie? This column argues that that a dispassionate examination is needed in order to properly reform the banking system. As the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 illustrates, a mad dash for regulation where special interests can manipulate popular outrage is a recipe for cooking up the next financial disaster.

David Jacks, Christopher M. Meissner, Dennis Novy, Friday, November 27, 2009

Trade has declined massively during the crisis. This chapter assesses the relative roles of falling demand and rising trade costs in explaining the collapse and compares it to the Great Depression. Surprisingly, the authors calculate that the increase in trade costs today is as large as in 1929 despite the absence of any modern protectionism resembling Smoot-Hawley. If their calculations turn out to be correct, reviving global demand alone will be insufficient to revive world trade.

Barry Eichengreen, Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke, Miguel Almunia, Agustín S. Bénétrix, Gisela Rua, Wednesday, November 18, 2009

There is one important source of information on the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal stimulus in an environment of near-zero interest rates, dysfunctional banking systems and heightened risk aversion that has not been fully exploited: the 1930s. This column gathers data on growth, budgets and central bank policy rates for 27 countries covering the period 1925-39 and shows that where fiscal policy was tried, it was effective.

Carlo Favero, Wednesday, November 18, 2009

Today’s global crisis has been compared to the Great Depression in terms of world output, trade, and stock market value. To extend the comparison, this column proposes a new, historically comparable measure of economic uncertainty. The evolution of uncertainty in this crisis has been much less dramatic than in the 1930s.

Lee E. Ohanian, Monday, October 19, 2009

What started the Great Depression? This column says that the industrial decline began before monetary contraction or banking panics – the conventional culprits – took hold. It attributes the massive drop in manufacturing hours to President Hoover’s labour policies, which kept nominal and real wages high.

Antonio Spilimbergo, Paola Giuliano, Friday, September 25, 2009

Economic events can have long-lasting non-economic effects. This column shows how economic circumstances affect individuals’ life-long beliefs. Individuals growing up during recessions tend to believe that success in life depends more on luck than on effort and support more government redistribution, but they are less confident in public institutions. The current severe recession may be forming a generation that is more risk-averse and believes more in redistribution.

Douglas L. Campbell, Christopher M. Meissner, Dennis Novy, David Jacks, Saturday, September 19, 2009

Trade has declined massively during the crisis. This column assesses the relative roles of falling demand and rising trade costs in explaining the collapse and compares it to the Great Depression. Surprising, the increase in trade costs today is as large as in 1929, despite the absence of any modern protectionism resembling Smoot-Hawley. It appears that reviving global demand alone will be insufficient to revive world trade.

Daniel Gros, Friday, May 1, 2009

Today’s general consensus is that a key factor behind the Great Depression was the breakdown of the US banking system and that we must avoid large-scale bank failures this time around at all costs. However, this column shows that commercial banks actually do relatively well during recessions. It is the financial sector outside banking – in other words, investment banking – that suffers huge losses.

Thomas Helbling, Wednesday, April 29, 2009

Despite the stunning contraction of industrial production and trade across the globe, the global economy is still a far cry away from the calamities of the Great Depression. However, if the economic damage of the current global crisis may have been contained so far, worrisome parallels to the early 1930s remain and preventive policy actions must be kept up.

Olivier Accominotti, Thursday, April 23, 2009

China’s “dollar trap” has many analysts worried about its future resolution. This column discusses a similar situation in the 1920s when France held more than half the world’s foreign reserves. France’s “sterling trap” ended disastrously. Sterling suffered a major currency crisis, French authorities lost a lot of money, and subsequent policy reactions deepened the Great Depression.

Nicholas Bloom, Friday, April 17, 2009

This column says that the policy response to the financial crisis seems to have been adequate – we will not slip into another Great Depression. It argues that growth will resume by late 2009, as uncertainty is subsiding due to global cooperation.

Barry Eichengreen, Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke, Monday, March 8, 2010

This column updates the original Vox columns by Barry Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke comparing today’s global crisis to the Great Depression. The three previous columns have shattered all Vox readership records with over 450,000 views. This latest edition covers up to February 2010 showing that, while there is cause for optimism, there is no room for complacency.

Enrique G. Mendoza, Thursday, February 12, 2009

This column rehabilitates Irving Fisher’s debt-deflation theory to explain the current crisis. It suggests that fiscal stimulus will do little to prevent the crisis from becoming a protracted slump because the problem lies in finance. A cure will require reversing deflation and restarting the credit system.

Nicholas Bloom, Wednesday, October 8, 2008

The crisis is shaping up to be a perfect storm – a huge surge in uncertainty that is generating a rapid slow-down in activity, a collapse of banking preventing many of the few remaining firms and consumers that want to invest from doing so, and a shift in the political landscape locking in the damage through protectionism and anti-competitive policies.

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